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The period since the mid-1970s has witnessed increasing interest 
and controversy in relations between central and local government 
as successive governments have sought to assert controls on local 
authorities' activities as part of wider economic and political 
programmes. Most attention has focussed on attempts to control 
local government expenditure in the context of the macro- 
econommic management of the economy, but in recent years, 
financial controls have been supplemented by legislative measures 
which have raised issues of a 'constitutional' nature (cf. 
Loughlin (1986)). Indeed, some commentators have argued that the 
controls introduced by the p~esent Conservative Government since 
1979 represet a fundamental re-structuring of central-local 
relations such as to constitute a threat to the future of local 
government (see Rhodes (1984) p 261). 
A considerable amount of work has been undertaken to examine the 
implications of changes in the system of local government finance 
in terms of their effect, firstly, on local authority spending, 
secondly, on management and organisation within local 
authorities, and, thirdly, on relations between central and local 
government. This last aspect has received particular attention, 
especially through an SSRC-funded research initiative in the 
early 1980s in which the issue of central-local financial 
relations figured prominently (Goldsmith, 1986). Moreover, in 
this context there have been developments in the theory of the 
state, particularly the relationship of the 'local state' to the 
'central state', deriving from the study of changes in central 
government financial controls (Martlew, 1983; Goldsmith and 
Villadsen, 1986). 
Clearly, the study of such changes will provide insights which 
will be valuable, firstly, in relation to the development of our 
ideas about the role and status of local government within the 
wider economic and political system and, secondly, in relation to 
the development of future policies for local government finance. 
To date, it would appear that most of the work in this area has 
focussed on aggregate spending by local authorities or classes of 
local authorities (e.g. shire/metropolitan/London authorities) 
and work on specific services has concentrated on such services 
as housing and education. It is considered, therefore, that an 
examination of the effects of changes in central government 
financial controls on local authorities' transport expenditure 
and provision will provide a valuable contribution to this area 
of study. 
i 
1.2 Chancres in the Transport Sector 
Of course, there are specific features of the financing of local 
transportation expenditure which differentiate it from other 
local authority functions and which complicate the analysis. 
Roads and transport take up some 7% of total current expenditure 
by local authorities in England and about 19% of capital 
expenditure (H M Treasury 1987, p. 365). Since 1974 local 
transport expenditure has--been supported by the Transport- 
Supplementary Grant (TSG), originally devised as a block grant to 
support both current and capital expenditure on roads and public 
transport and, as such, supplementing Rate Support Grant (RSG) in 
respect of current expenditure and local authority borrowing in 
respect of capital expenditure (Department of the Environment, 
1975). Since the financial year 1985/86 TSG has been payable 
only in respect of capital expenditure on road schemes of more 
than local importance, local transportation current expenditure 
now being supported, like other local authority services, by 
block grant. 
Other changes in central government controls have been introduced 
affecting the financing of local public transport. Following the 
Lords' declaration that the GLC1s 'Fares Fair1 policy was 
illegal, the Government took steps in the 1983 Transport Act to 
limit spending by the GLC and Metropolitan Counties on public 
transport revenue support. In 1984 the Government took over 
direct control of London Regional Transport from the GLC. 
Subsequently, the GLC and the Metropolitan Counties were 
abolished and strict precept control was imposed upon the 
successor Passenger Transport Authorities in the provincial 
metropolitan areas. The final complicating factor in respect of 
local public transport is the deregulation of local bus transport 
and the requirement for authorities to introduce competitive 
tendering for non-commercial services, pursuant to the 1985 
Transport Act. 
These changes are in addition to those introduced in respect of 
the general system of local government finance, in particular the 
Block Grant system for supporting current expenditure and the 
system of capital expenditure control, both deriving from the 
Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, and subsequent 
modifications to these systems, most notably the scheme of 
targets and grant penalties which operated from 1981/82 to 
1985/86, and the 'rate-capping1 scheme introduced from 1985/86. 
Clearly, then, since 1979 there have been a large number of 
changes in the financial system which will have affected local 
transportation expenditure. Each will have had differential 
impacts on current and capital spending, and on the various 
components of such spending. Identifying the nature of these 
impacts will be difficult due to the multi-dimensional character 
of the problem. 
1.3 ScoDe and Methodolow 
The scope of the study will be restricted to attempting to assess 
the effects of changes in systems of financial control; we do not 
intend to attempt to analyse the effects of the abolition of the 
Metropolitan Counties nor of the deregulation of local bus 
transport. In effect, we shall attempt to 'control out' the 
impacts of these changes. The basic objective of the study will 
be to identify the effects of changes in central government 
policies and powers in respect of local government finance on 
local authorities' transportation expenditure and on their 
ability effectively to tackle local transport problems and to 
meet local transport needs. Based upon these results we will 
attempt to identify implications for policies towards the 
financing of local transport and for our ideas about central- 
local relations. .-. . 
The methodology of the study can be described in terms of three 
main stages. The first stage is a review and examination of the 
system of local government finance in general and, within this 
context, of the system of financing local transportation 
expenditure. This review will cover the major changes introduced 
since 1979 and commentaries on, and critiques of, the system in 
the context of more general work on central-local relations. 
Following on from this, the second stage will comprise an 
analysis of trends in the level and pattern of local government 
transportation expenditure during the period since 1979 comparing 
actual expenditure firstly, with central government plans and 
provisions and, secondly, with the expenditure aspirations and 
needs of local authorities (as far as indicators of the latter 
can be obtained). The relationship of this analysis to the major 
changes in government policies and controls will provide a first 
level of insight into the effects of such changes and will 
indicate areas for more detailed examination. 
This more detailed examination will be undertaken in relation to 
information from a sample of local authorities, and the in-depth 
analysis of the impact of government controls on such local 
authorities' transportation expenditure and provision and on 
their ability to tackle effectively local transport problems and 
to meet local needs, will constitute the third stage of the 
study. 
1.4 Outline of the Report 
This report relates to the first stage of the study. The next 
section presents a brief review of the nature of the fiscal 
relationship between central and local government and of 
theoretical issues in this area. Section 3 presents a 
description of the system of central government financial control 
over local authorities, the main changes since 1979, and 
discusses criticisms which have been levelled at the system. 
Section 4 focusses in more detail on the system for financing 
local transportation expenditure. Section 5 concludes the report 
by summarising the main issues of relevance for the next stages 
of the research. 
2. Local Government Finance and Central-Local Relations 
2.1 Introduction 
Local government plays a very important role in the economic, 
social and political life of the country. Local authoritiesv 
spending accounts for just over one quarter of total UK public 
expenditure (Planning Total) and represents about 10% of GDP (H M 
Treasury 1987, p. 355). However, this represents a decrease from 
the position in the mid-1970s when local authority expenditure 
represented over 30% of the public sector and accounted for some 
15% of GDP (Boddy 1984, p 232). Therefore, over a period when 
total public expenditure has grown in real terms, the role of 
local government in the public sector has declined while the 
share of central government expenditure has increased. 
This trend is explained by the focus of successive governments 
since the mid 1970s on controlling public expenditure in general 
and local government expenditure in particular. This concern 
originated in the economic crisis which followed the rapid 
escalation of oil prices in 1973/74: a reduction in public 
expenditure was part of the price which the Labour Government had 
to pay between 1976 and 1979 for IMF assistance. In this 
context, the Treasury sought to regain firm control over public 
spending and a particular pre-occupation with local authority 
spending arose for two reasons. Firstly, the degree of local 
autonomy enjoyed by local authorities reduced the effectiveness 
of central control instruments. Secondly, resistance by central 
government departments to cuts in their budgets (and, indeed, 
pressures to increase some budgets as the economic crisis 
deepened) tended to 'displace the cuts outwards from the centre'; 
in other words, it was easier for the Treasury to cash limit 
local authorities than to argue with other Cabinet Ministers 
(Wright, 1982, p. 18-24). The election of the Conservative 
Government in 1979 reinforced this process and local authorities 
were placed under increasing fiscal pressure. 
2.2 A Theoretical Persuective 
The interpretation of this approach by central government to 
controlling local government spending requires reference to 
theories about the nature of central-local relations. Annex 1 
smmarises briefly some recent theoretical work on central-local 
government relations. Here, we state in outline terms an 
approach deriving from martlew (1983) which can provide a context 
for our analysis. 
This approach focuses on the 'structural constraints' on state 
action, and the 'hierarchical relationship' between central and 
local government and relates these to 'institutional interests'. 
Thus, the state can be seen as embodying a variety of interests 
which compete and conflict with one another and these interests 
are related to the requirement of the state, firstly, to promote 
capital accumulation through its various roles and activities 
and, secondly, to protect the accumulation process by controlling 
the fiscal demands of state activities and services (Martlew op 
cit, p. 129). Tension or conflicts between the 'institutional 
interests' within the state.apparatus arises from the 
contradiction between, on the one hand, pressures to increase 
state spending (both to assist capital accumulation and to 
provide the welfare services needed to maintain political support 
and legitimacy) and, on the other hand, pressures to control 
demands on the state budget (to ensure that private accumulation 
is not undermined). These tensions or conflicts provide the 
structural constraints on state action and express the dominance 
of interests related to the promotion and protection of capital 
accumulation (ibid, p. 130-1). 
More specifically, such conflicts between 'institutional 
interests' and mediated through central departments of the state 
and, via their control, local authorities. On the one hand, the 
various central spending departments undertake activities and 
provide services to support private sector accumulation, to 
reproduce the labour force and to provide welfare services, with 
various of these activities and services being the main 
responsibility of local government within parameters set by the 
central departments. On the other hand, interests related to 
controlling state spending so as to ensure that it does not 
undermine private accumulation, are embodied mainly in the 
Treasury (ibid, p. 132-3). Within this framework local 
government can be seen as playing a role in the provision of 
services to support capital accumulation, labour force 
reproduction and to support a level of welfare provision 
sufficient to maintain the legitimacy of the state, subject to 
structural constraints deriving from the balance of institutional 
interests within the state. Moreover, local government can be 
seen as playing an important additional role in maintaining the 
political legitimacy of the state in that it fragments and tends 
to mask responsibility for the provision of services and 
therefore absorbs and disperses political opposition which would 
otherwise focus entirely on the central state (ibid, p. 132). 
This provides a conceptual basis for examining central government 
financial controls on local government. We shall now examine 
briefly the general arguments put foward for such controls before 
looking at the changes which have taken place since 1979. 
2.3 Central Government Financial Control of Local Authorities 
Within the structure of the British political system, local 
authorities are viewed as statutory corporations dependent upon 
statutory authority for power to act. This is judicially 
enforceable through the doctrine of ultra vires. Since local 
authorities are elected bodies there is a tradition of vesting 
enabling powers in them in broad discretionary terms, but the 
most significant powers contain provision for central government 
control or supervision over the manner in which those powers are 
exercised (Loughlin 1986, p. 176). Central government has a wide 
range of powers and controls available (financial, 
administrative, technical, legal) but financial controls are 
perhaps the most important in the relationship between central 
and local government. 
The argument which asserts the need for central government to 
control the activities of local government for the purpose of 
overall macroeconomic management, is associated most closely with 
the Treasury and can be i&erpreted (following the framework 
outlined in Section 2.2. above) in terms of the institutional 
interest embodied in, and mediated through, the Treasury related 
to the need to protect private capital accumulation from upward 
pressures on state spending. However, a full explanation is 
likely to be more complex because it is clear that local 
government is not simply the 'agent' of central government and 
embodies an important degree of political autonomy and 
discretion. 
The argument for central government financial control of local 
authorities as part of the overall management of the economy has 
been promoted forcefully by the Treasury since the shift in 
macroeconomic policy initiated by the economic crisis and the IMF 
intervention in the mid-1970s (Meadows and Jackson, 1986; Boddy, 
1984). The argument has been re-stated and developed by the 
Conservative Government since 1979 as part of its monetarist 
policies and receives a recent exposition in the 1986 White Paper 
'Paying for Local Government' (Department of the Environment, 
1986). 
"Because Governments are responsible for the overall 
management of the economy, they have to be concerned with 
the amount of local authority expenditure, borrowing and 
taxation. Local authority borrowing has implications for 
the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), the rate of 
monetary growth, and interest rates. Local authority 
current expenditure, whether it is financed by local or 
national taxation, affects the overall burden of taxation in 
the economy and the balance between public and private 
sector output. 
Since 1979 the Government has been committed to reducing 
inflation and setting the foundation for sustained economic 
growth. The rate of monetary expansion had to be curbed, 
and public borrowing had to be reduced so as to ease the 
pressure on interest rates. Higher local authority 
borrowing would have made it harder for the Government to 
achieve these objectives. 
The Government has also sought to reduce the size of the 
public sector in order to allow reductions in the level of 
taxation and more freedom for individuals and firms to 
choose which goods and services they wished to consume." 
(ibid, paras 1.13 - 1.15) 
In general terms, then, central government's case for controlling 
the activities of local authorities is based on the contention 
that their spending has contributed to excessive growth in the 
money supply, has increased inflation and interest rates, and has 
had an adverse impact on the private sector by 'crowding outn 
private economic activity and by placing an excessive burden on 
industry and commerce via non-domestic rates (Meadows and Jackson 
1986, p. 65; Boddy 1984, p. 229). 
However, this case has been subjected to several criticisms which 
cast severe doubts on its validity. The critique focuses on the 
'crowding out' thesis which comprises two main elements. First, 
'direct crowding out' occus  when public spending displaces 
private sector consumption or investment without any intermediate 
changes in interest rates, prices or exchange rates i.e. there is 
a direct shift in resources from the private to the public 
sector. Work by Meadows and Jackson (1984) has found that real 
resource consumption by local authorities has declined since the 
early 1970s and that there is no evidence to support direct 
crowding out either in the capital or in the labour market. 
Secondly, 'indirect crowding out' occurs when increased public 
spending places upward pressure on interest rates by increasing 
demand in the financial markets, thus suppressing private 
spending. Again, Meadows and Jackson find no evidence that local 
authority borrowing for capital expenditure (i.e. contribution to 
PSBR) has placed any undue strains on financial markets, 
particularly in view of a decline in local authority capital 
spending in real terms, and conclude that a possible small 
contribution to increase in money supply via bank borrowing has 
probably had little effect on inflation (ibid, p. 79-84). 
On the question of the impact of non-domestic rates on economic 
activity critics point out, firstly, that rates constitute only a 
very small proportion of industrial costs (c. 2-3%) and, 
secondly, that they represent a payment for goods and services 
which benefit industry and commerce directly or indirectly 
(Meadows and Jackson op.cit, p. 84-5; Boddy 1984, p. 231). 
Moreover, the impact of rate increases on inflation is likely to 
be relatively small even assuming that they are passed on in full 
by firms in higher prices and that they influence the wage 
bargaining process (Meadows and Jackson op.cit, p. 85-6). 
Consequently, there would appear to be little empirical 
foundation for the argument that central control of local 
authorities is crucial for the achievement of macroeconomic 
objectives, beyond the case for controlling borrowing. On 
rational economic grounds, then, it is difficult to see the 
justification for the measures for detailed control of local 
authority expenditure which have been introduced by central 
government since the late 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  even in terms of the monetorist 
theories which have been prevalent since that time (cf. Boddy 
1984, p. 233). It may be, therefore, that this rational 
macroeconomic argument to some extent disguises the real purposes 
of control. Based upon the theoretical discussion in Section 2.2 
above two possible themes are suggested. 
The first theme derives from the contradictory pressures within 
the state on the one hand to increase spending to support capital 
accumulation, reproduction of the labour force and 'safety net' 
welfare services and, on the other hand, to control the state's 
fiscal demands, especially during periods of economic recession. 
Pressure to control and cut back public spending will inevitably 
produce conflict over where cuts should be made and such 
conflicts will be resolved in the light of the balance of 
institutional interests within the state apparatus. Within 
central government, the cuts can be directed to particular 
departments and programmes in the context of the Public 
Expenditure Survey process and associated cabinet-level 
negotiations. However, local authorities traditionally have 
discretion to decide on relative spending priorities between 
services so central government has less influence over where cuts 
are made at the local level; It is possible, therefore, that the 
changes in control measures since the late 1970s can be 
interpreted in terms of an attempt by central government to. 
influence the distribution of local authority spending in terms 
of its relation to the capital accumulation process while being 
seen to remain within 'acceptable1 parameters of central 
interference with local autonomy in order to retain legitimacy. 
The second theme derives from the role of local government in 
maintaining the political legitimacy of the state and from the 
wider political objectives of the Government. Thus, measures to 
control and reduce local government spending can be seen as part 
of a broader political and ideological programme involving the 
rolling back of the public sector, freeing market forces, 
privatisation and tax cuts (cf. Boddy 1984, p. 233). Local 
authorities have been subjected to a wide range of measures since 
1979 besides direct financial controls including the requirement 
for competitive tendering, the requirement to sell council 
houses, legal limitation of public transport fare subsidies and 
the abolition of the GLC and the Metropolitan Counties. Boddy 
(op cit, p. 235) argues that such It.. cuts, controls and 
privatisation represent an attack on the political and 
ideological principles of collective provision of goods and 
services to meet social need." The aim of combatting lsocialism' 
has been stated frequently by representatives of the present 
Conservative Government. Therefore, it is possible to interpret 
financial control measures in terms of the pre-occupation since 
1979 with 'high spending1 local authorities, invariably seen as 
lsocialistl authorities. Moreover, by placing the spotlight on 
local authority 'overspending1 and 'profligacy1 central 
government is able to deflect political opposition to its 
policies and measures and may also be able to legitimise the 
introduction of new measures on the grounds that they are 
required to overcome the deficiencies of local government. These 
factors are, perhaps, reinforced by what Greenwood (1982) calls 
the Icultural disdain1 for local government in Britain which is 
widely seen as 'low politics1 and, therefore, ripe for criticism 
and control (cf. Page 1986, p. 133-4). 
Against this background it is now possible to examine in more 
detail the changes in the system of local government finance 
which have been introduced since 1979. In Section 3 we shall 
look at the changes to the system in general and then, in Section 
4, at the system for financing local transportation expenditure. 
3. The Svstem of Local Government Finance 
3.1 Introduction 
As indicated earlier, many commentators have referred to the 
significant increase in central control over local authorities 
which has been achieved via the changes in the system of local 
government finance since 1979 (cf. Travers, 1986; Page, 1986; 
Meadows, 1985). Certainly, there has been a reinforcement of the 
trend evident prior to 1979 in the Labour Government's response 
to the economic crisis. The Conservative Government elected in 
May 1979 quickly addressed the problem of reducing local 
government spending, using extortations to local authorities to 
reduce their budgets for 1979/80 immediately by 3%, and to plan 
for 1980/81 on the basis of a 5% reduction from the previous 
Labour Government's plans (Meadows 1985, p. 147). As it became 
clear that such reductions would not be forthcoming and that 
certain authorities were 'overspending1 by a significant amount, 
the Government focussed increasingly on the inadequacies of the 
Rate Support Grant system both for controlling local government 
spending in general and for controlling particular high spending 
authorities in particular (ibid; Travers 1986, p. 82-4; Gibson 
1982, p. 16-17) . 
In this context, the Government introduced the Local Government 
Planning and Land (No. 2) Bill in 1980 which contained proposals 
for a new block grant system and for a new system of control over 
capital expenditure. Since 1980 the block grant system has been 
subject to several modifications which have added to its 
complexity while the capital expenditure system has undergone fewer 
changes. The next section deals with the block grant system, 
describing the public expenditure planning system of which it is 
a part, perceived problems in the rate support grant system which 
it replaced, the basic system introduced in the 1980 Act, 
subsequent modifications and developments, and discussing the 
criticisms which have been levelled at the system. We then deal 
in a similar way with the capital expenditure control system. 
3.2 The Block Grant Svstem I 
3.2.1 Rate Suv~ort Grant and Public Emenditure Planning 
Since the mid-1970s the determination of the level of grant 
support for local authority current spending has been undertaken 
increasingly in the context of the broader central expenditure 
planning process through the Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
(PESC). The PESC system involves negotiations between the 
Treasury and central spending departments to produce spending 
plans for the next financial year, and outline intentions for the 
two subsequent financial years, which are announced in the 
Chancellor's Autumn Statement and subsequently published in more 
detail in the Public Expenditure White Paper (Bennett 1982, p. 
70-2). In the context of these plans the Government determines 
provisional figures for local authority total expenditure and 
Government grant towards that expenditure after consultations 
with the local authority associations in the Consultative Council 
for Local Government Finance (CCLGF) (House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee 1985, Appendix 1). 
The planned total of Government Grants to local authorities is 
the Aggregate Exchequer Grant (AEG). As a proportion of local 
authority total relevant expenditure in England and Wales AEG has 
declined from a peak of 66.4% in 1975/76 to 44.3% in 1986/87. 
'Relevant expenditure' for grant purposes is virtually all 
revenue expenditure chargeable to local authorities' Rate Funds. 
Specific and Supplementary Grants represent the first call on 
AEG. Specific grants are paid to support services where the 
Government wishes to have an influence over the way in which 
money is spent by local authorities or where local authorities 
act essentially as agents for central government. The largest 
specific grant is for police forces which accounts for more than 
half the total. The major supplementary grant in respect of 
transport is paid to assist local authorities with highway 
capital schemes of more than local significance (see Section 4 
below). Specific and supplementary grants together represented 
24.8% of the planned AEG for England and Wales in 1987/88; their 
importance has increased in recent years the equivalent 
proportion in 1980/81 being 16.4% (H M Treasury 1980, 1987). 
The balance of AEG net of specific and supplementary grants 
represents the amount available for payment of Rate Support Grant 
(RSG) to local authorities. The first charge on this balance is 
the Domestic Rate Relief Grant (DRRG) which reimburses local 
authorities in full for revenue foregone due to the granting of 
relief to domestic rate payers. The level of such relief is 
prescribed by the Secretary of State and currently provides that 
domestic rate poundages must be 18.5~ in the pound lower than 
those of businesses. DRRG represented 5.2% of the planned AEG 
for England and Wales in 1987/88. The remainder of AEG (i.e. 
RSG-DRRG), which is treated as a cash limited provision, is 
available for distribution to local authorities as 'Block Grant' 
towards their expenditure generally. This represented 70% of the 
planned AEG for England and Wales in 1987/88. 
3.2.2 The Reform of Rate Sumort Grant 1981/2: Block Grant 
The concept of Block Grant was introduced in 1981/2 as a new 
approach to distributing grant support between individual local 
authorities. Prior to 1981/2 the distribution methodology was 
based on the distinction between the 'resources element' of grant 
which represented a 'resource equalisation' component designed to 
compensate local authorities with a low rateable value per head, 
and the 'needs element1, representing a 'needs equalisation' 
component designed to compensate local authorities with high 
expenditure needs. The overall aim of the system was to ensure 
that all local authorities should be able to charge similar rate 
poundages if they spent at the level of their assessed needs 
(Bennett 1982, Chapter 4) . 
However, in the context of their concern to reduce local 
authority spending and the difficulties experienced achieving 
such a reduction (particularly for certain 'recalcitrant' 
authorities), the Conservative Government elected in May 1979 
came to regard the then existing RSG system as seriously 
deficient. The perceived problems related to the control both of 
total local authority spending and of the spending of particular 
local authorities who were,defying the Government's policies (cf. 
Travers 1986, Chapter 8). Two particular drawbacks in the system 
were highlighted. 
The first problem arose from the approach to resource 
equalisation which compensated an authority with a low rateable 
value per head on the basis of the actual rate poundage levied by 
that authority - the higher the rate levied the higher the 
resources grant received. Therefore, high spending authorities 
received more grant but, because the total of grant was cash 
limited, the grant for all other local authorities was 
correspondingly reduced. In the Government's eyes, therefore, 
low spending authorities were being penalised for the benefit of 
high spending authorities - precisely the reverse of the 
situation which it wished to bring about (Department of the 
Evironment 1986 para 4.13; Greenwood 1982, p. 51-2; Page 1986, p. ---. 
The second perceived problem arose from the approach to needs 
equalisation which compensated authorities for unavoidable 
differences in their spending per capita due to socio-economic 
and physical factors. This involved the use of multiple 
regression analysis to select and weight social and economic 
indicators which correlated with the broad pattern of actual 
local authority spending. Now there have been extensive 
criticisms of the use of multiple regression analysis in this way 
(cf. Bennett 1982, p. 86-102) but the Government's major concern 
arose from the fact that if a group of authorities with similar 
characteristics (e.g. London authorities, metropolitan 
authorities) increased their spending this would be interpreted 
by the regression analysis as evidence of a greater need to spend 
in these authorities. Therefore, such authorities would be 
rewarded with higher needs grant allocations again, in a cash 
limited context, at the expense of other authorities (Department 
of the Environment 1986, para 4.14). 
The new block grant system was introduced in the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act 1980 and was intended to overcome these 
perceived deficiencies. The Government justified the new system 
on the grounds that it would be la... fairer and more 
accessible...I1 and I#.. much more logical and defensible ... II
(ibid, para 4.15). Other commentators have emphasised the 
objectives of controlling local authority spending and, in 
particular, high spending authorities (Greenwood 1982; Page 1986; 
Martlew 1983). The block grant system, like that it replaced, is 
concerned with equalising between authorities in terms of both 
need to spend and resources, the basic principle being that of 
rate poundage equalisation. That is, the aim of block grant 
distribution is to ensure that, regardless of differences in 
their spending needs and rateable resources, all authorities of 
the same type are in a position to finance a comparable standard 
of service for the same rate poundage.(l) 
(1) Full descriptions of the block grant system are provided in 
the annual Rate Support Grant Orders, Department of the 
Environment (1986 Annex 13), Audit Commission (1984), House 
of Commons Public Aceounts Committee (1985 Appendix I) on 
which this discussion relies. 
The system is based upon two essential features. First, a . 
'grant-related expenditure' (GRE) is determined for each 
authority which is an estimate of the overall cost to an 
authority of providing a common standard of service taking into 
account variations in local circumstances and needs. An 
authority's total GRE is built up on a serice-by-service basis in 
terms of a formula assessing the need for spending as a function 
of the number of 'clients' for the service (or units of service 
required) and the unit cost of providing the service, adjusted to 
take account of special factors affecting the cost of provision 
(e.g. population density, social problems). The sum of GREs for 
all authorities is calculated to be consistent with the 
Government's overall spending plans for services (i.e. relevant 
expenditure allocated to services excluding specific and 
supplementary grants). - 
Once GRE1s have been set, the second feature of the system comes 
into play, which measures the extent to which an authority can 
finance its GRE from its own rateable resources. In order to 
equalise differences in rateable resources between authorities 
'grant-related poundage' (GRP) is calculated which specifies a 
common rate poundage which all authorities of the same type are 
assumed to levy for spending at the level of GRE. Each class of 
local authority has a GRP schedule which specifies a GRP for 
levels of spending above and below GRE in such a way as to 
increase the assumed rate yield for authorities spending above 
GRE and to decrease it for those spending below GRE. Above a 
certain 'threshold' level of expenditure, the slope of the GRP 
schedule increases (the 'taper') in such a way as to have a large 
impact on higher spending authorities. 
The system is described in some detail in Annex 2; the following 
represents a summary outline of the formulae for block grant 
distribution: 
Block Grant = Total Expenditure - (GRP x Rateable Value 
x Multiplier) 
For total expenditure below threshold: 
GRP = GRP* + x (Total ex~enditure - GRE) 
population 
For total expenditure in excess of threshold: 
GRP = GRP* + x (Threshold*) + 
y (Total Exl~enditure - a - Threshold*) 
population 
where GRP* is the GRP for spending at GRE by class of authority 
Threshold* is the amount ( #  per head) by which threshold 
exceeds GRE for the relevant class of authority 
x and y represent the marginal increases (in pence) in 
assumed GRP for every # per head increase in spending 
below and above threshold. 
Multipliers are used to effect various adjustments as 
designated by the Secretary of State. 
. 
It is evident, therefore, that for the same level of spending in 
relation to GRE, an authority with a low rateable value will 
receive more block grant than an authority with a high rateable 
value. Indeed, if the rate income which the prescribed GRP would 
produce exceeds an authority's total expenditure, that authority 
will receive no block grant. If an authority spends at a level 
above GRE its assumed GRP is increased and block grant 
correspondingly reduced. In the above formulae, the slope of the 
GRP below and above the threshold is represented by x and y. Up 
to 1986/7 the threshold was set at GRE plus 10% and the values of 
x and y were 0.6p and 0.75~ respectively. Consequently, 
authorities spending above threshold suffered a reduced increment 
of block grant (see Annex 2). 
The basic block grant formula above incorporates the use of 
multipliers which adjust an authority's grant entitlement for 
various reasons, primarily to prevent large changes in grant 
entitlement from year to year due to changes in GRE calculations 
('Safety nets' to limit losses; 'caps' to limit gains). 
Multipliers are also used to effect resource adjustments in 
respect of the London authorities. 
3.2.3 Criticisms of the Block Grant Svstem 
Before going on to consider developments and modifications of the 
block grant system since its introduction it is appropriate to 
discuss the main criticisms which have been directed at the basic 
system. First, local authorities reacted to the system with the 
charge that it represented an unwarranted extension of central 
government influence and control over local authorities and, in 
particular, an attack on Labour-controlled councils (Greenwood, 
1982, p. 57-8; Bennett, 1982, p. 127). Second, the system 
involves a large number of decisions which are largely political 
but these are disguised behind claims of objectivity and 
rationality; the assessments of GRE, GRP, the threshold term and 
the tapering multiplier are largely political choices by the 
Secretary of State (Bennett op cit; Hepworth, 1984, p. 60-2). 
Third, the Government does not provide local authorities with 
forward projections of grant support and this inhibits longer 
term planning by authorities thus adversely affecting their 
effectiveness (Audit Commission, 1984 p. 12-16). Fourth, the 
cash limit on block grant and the 'close-ending' requirement (see 
Annex 2) means that an authority's grant entitlement can change 
during the course of a year since it is affected by the spending 
decisions of other authorities; this increases the uncertainty 
for authorities (ibid. p. 18-21). Recognition of this problem 
has led the Government to abolish close-ending adjustments from 
1987/88 (Department of Environment, 1987, p. 18). 
The fifth criticism concerns the needs equalisation element of 
the system through the calculation of GREs. The fairness of the 
equalisation process depends crucially on the reliability of GREs 
as objective measures of the cost to each local authority of 
providing services to a common standard. However, there are many 
problems in the determination of GREs deriving from sparse and 
out-of-date information, the extent to which factors used reflect 
needs and the use of value judgements. Frequent changes are made 
to methodology and data used producing volatility in grant 
entitlements which exacerbates the uncertainty experienced by 
local authorities. Multipliers are used to moderate such changes 
in grant entitlement but such multipliers detract from the 
equalisation objective (Audit Commission, 1984; Department of 
Environment, 1986, Chapter 4, House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee 1985) . 
The sixth area of criticism concerns the resource equalisation 
element of the system through the GRP schedule which embodies "... an immense complexity of decision1' (Bennett, 1982, p. 128). 
In particular, there is the division of relevant expenditures 
between levels of local government and the setting of the 
threshold and taper determining the loss of grant to 
'overspending1 authorities. A further criticism of the resource 
equalisation process is that the transfer of resources on the 
basis of rateable values per-head penalises high rateable value 
areas excessively because average domestic rateable values do not 
reflect accurately the ability to pay for local authority 
services particularly in view of the lack of a revaluation in 
England since 1973 (Department of Environment 1986, paras. 4.19- 
4.25). 
Overall, the system has been critcised for being excessively 
complicated and difficult for local authority members and 
officers to understand. In particular, the Audit Commission 
found that the uncertainties in the system had discouraged 
authorities from effective financial management and had 
encouraged the build-up of special reserves and balances and the 
development of 'creative accounting1 (Audit Commission 1984). 
However, the criticisms of the Audit Commission relating to the 
basic block grant system were intensified in the consideration of 
modifications made to the basic system after its introduction in 
1980/81, in particular the system of expenditure targets and 
grant penalties. 
3.2.4 Exvenditure Taraets and Grant Penalties 
Following early difficulties in achieving expenditure control the 
Government, in the Local Government Finance Act 1982, introduced 
a system of expenditure targets and grant penalties and abolished 
the power of local authorities to raise supplementary rates or 
precepts. The target and penalty system operated for the 
financial years 1981/2 to 1985/6. It was not an integral part of 
the block grant system but rather was 'grafted on1 to attempt to 
tighten up expenditure controls (Greenwood, 1982, p. 63-4; Smith 
and Stewart, 1985). Authorities' expenditure guidance or targets 
were not derived from GREs but were designed to achieve volume 
reductions in total expenditure from previous years and were 
related to the Government's public expenditure plans. Authorities 
spending in excess of their targets suffered a loss of grant in 
accordance with principles outlined by the Secretary of State in 
the annual Rate Support Grant Report. The grant adjustment was 
effected by setting the multipliers in the block grant formula 
(cf. p. 12 above and Annex 2) at greater than 1 for authorities 
exceeding their targets thus effectively increasing their GRPs in 
accordance with a schedule drawn up by the Secretary of State 
which increased the severity of the grant penalty as an 
authority's percentage overspend increased. Moreover, the 
severity of penalties experienced by authorities for a given 
percentage overspend increased over the years 1981/2 to 1985/6. 
For example, in 1981/2 the grant loss for an authority spending 
5% over target was equivalent to a 9p rate: in 1985/6 this had 
increased to 42p. This loss of grant (known as 'holdback' or 
'penalty') was in addition to reductions due to the tapering of 
the GRP schedule above threshold in the block grant system 
(Hepworth, 1984, p. 308-9; Travers, 1986, p. 125-30). 
Critics have argued that the effect of target and penalties was 
to increase the complexity and uncertainty of the system and to 
undermine and distort its basic rationale while failing to 
achieve their basic objective of achieving control over local 
authorities' spending. In particular, the Audit Commission 
investigation referred to above found that targets and penalties 
produce 'perverse incentives1 for local authorities to play the 
system and manage grant levels by building up excessive balances 
(Audit Commission 1984). The use of expenditure targets which 
differed from GREs tended to undermine the rationale of the 
system which was built around GREs as supposedly objective 
measures of the need to spend (ibid; House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee 1985, para 15-23). Finally, the evidence 
suggests that the target and penalty system, far from restraining 
local authorities' spending, actually encouraged authorities to 
increase their spending. This was because, given the expectation 
of increasingly severe penalties from year to year, it was in the 
interests of authorities to spend up to target in any year to 
maximise grant and even to spend over target in order to attempt 
to generate a higher base-line for subsequent targets when 
penalties would be more severe (ibid. para. 18; Smith and 
Stewart, 1985) . 
Following the recommendations of the Audit Commission and the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, the Government 
discontinued targets and penalties from 1986/7 and replaced them 
with a modification to the GRP schedule in the basic block grant 
system. The taper on the GRP schedule above threshold was 
increased so that authorities spending above that level lost 
block grant. In effect, referring to the formulae set out above 
(p. 12), the values of x and y in the GRP formulae were 
increased to l.lp and 1.5p respectively (see also Annex 2). 
The other major development relative to central government 
control of local authority current expenditure is the 
introduction of 'rate-capping1 in the Rates Act 1984. This 
measure reflects increasing concern by the Conservative 
Government at continued 'overspending' by certain local 
authorities and also concern about the impact on rates of such 
spending (Travers, 1986, p. 145). It was clear that, in relation 
to these concerns, there was a deficiency in the control system 
since reductions in central government grant were tending to 
'work through1 into rate increases as local government 
expenditure continued to increase. Therefore, the Conservatives1 
manifesto for the 1983 General Election contained proposals to 
limit rate increases by local authorities and also to abolish the 
GLC and Metropolitan Counties which were seen by the Government 
as the worst offenders in terms of 'profligate overspending' and 
as major obstacles to the-achievement of control over local 
government expenditure (Travers op cit, Chapter 9). 
Following a White Paper which indicated that the existing rating 
system would be retained for 'I... the foreseeable future..." the 
Government legislated in the Rates Act 1984 for powers to impose 
limits on the rates of either specified local authorities 
('selective rate limitation') or all authorities ('general rate 
limitation'). The Government introduced the selective scheme in 
summer 1984 designating 18 authorities (including the GLC, two 
Metropolitan Councils and nine London Boroughs) for rate-capping 
in 1985/6. Authorities spending below GRE or less than #10 
million (index linked from 1985/6) are exempt from the selective 
scheme but any other authority can be selected whose expenditure 
is considered by the Secretary of State to be 'I... excessive 
having regard to the general economic conditions1' (Department of 
Environment, Rate Limitation Reports 1984-6). In 1985/6 
'excessiveness1 was defined in relation to expenditure targets, 
but has subsequently been defined in relation to increases in 
spending over previous years. Once selected, authorities are 
given 'expenditure levels1 (ELs) for the following year and a 
rate limit is calculated on the basis of the EL, block grant 
entitlement and levels of reserves. Authorities can appeal for a 
redetermination by the Secretary of State and this can result in 
an increased, reduced or unchanged EL (Department of Environment 
1986, Annex B; Travers, 1986, p. 158-64). 
Over the four years of operation of the selective scheme (1985/6 
to 1988/9) 31 authorities have been designated at some time. Of 
these 13 have been included in more than one year and 9 in all 
four years (7 of which are London Boroughs) (Department of 
Environment, 1984-6, Rate Limitation Reports). In the first two 
years of the scheme two authorities (Lambeth and Liverpool) 
failed to set a legal rate and councillors in these authorities 
have subsequently been surcharged and disqualified (Travers, 
1986, p. 164-71). Apart from this the general picture has been 
reluctant compliance by the predominantly Labour-controlled 
authorities involved although the evidence suggests that most 
authorities have been able to continue to increase their spending 
(ibid, p. 172-6). One reason for this is that many of the 
authorities involved are Metropolitan Districts and London 
Boroughs (10 out of 12 in 1986/7 and 16 out of 20 in 1987/8) and, 
following the abolition of the GLC and Metropolitan Counties, the 
Government tended to treat such authorities leniently in order to 
moderate rate increases in these areas so as to justify abolition 
(Travers, 1985). 
It is possible to see the Government's rate-capping powers (in 
conjunction with the abolition of the GLC and Metropolitan 
Counties) as a logical extension of its concern with local 
authorities1 spending which has moved progressively from the 
objective of controlling local government expenditure in general 
to an increasing focus on controlling particular 'high spending' 
authorities. The progression of measures through the 
introduction of the block grant system, the super-imposition of 
the system of targets and penalties, the abolition of the power 
to raise supplementary rates and precepts and the introduction of 
rate-capping indicate an increasing degree of central control 
over local authorities. The proposed reforms of the grant system 
and replacement of domestic rates by a 'poll tax' can again be 
seen to follow logically from the concern with high spending 
authorities and with the impact of local authority rates. 
However, before considering these proposed reforms it is , 
necessary to complete the picture of changes in financial 
controls on local authorities since 1979 by considering capital 
expenditure. 
3.3 Capital Ex~enditure 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In general terms capital expenditure covers expenditure on fixed 
assets and stockbuilding. More specifically in a local authority 
context capital expenditure covers the purchase and construction 
of new buildings, roads and other structures, major renovation 
and improvement works, the acquisition of land, vehicles, plant 
and equipment, and the making of grants and advances for similar 
purposes including mortgages. Also included are the capital 
value of assets acquired under financial leases, property leased 
for more than 20 years, property sold (or leased out) and leased 
back, and all vehicles leased for more than one year. 
Nevertheless, there is no hard and fast distinction between 
capital and revenue expenditure and there are variations between 
authorities in respect of the classification of certain items of 
expenditure (e.g. purchase of small equipment, repair and renewal 
expenditure) (Audit Commission 1983 Appendix A; Department of the 
Environment 1986 Ch 6; H M Treasury 1987 p 420). 
Local authority gross capital spending in 1985/6 totalled #6.2 
billion. Since most capital expenditure is financed by borrowing 
the Government exercises close control on the grounds that such 
borrowing contributes to the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR), and control of the latter is necessary in the context of 
the broader macroeconomic management of the economy as a whole. 
The Government's stated objectives for a control system are, 
firstly, that it should provide effective Government influence 
over aggregate levels of local authority capital expenditure and 
borrowing; secondly, that it should promote the Government's aim 
of reducing the size of the public sector by encouraging asset 
sales; and, thirdly, that it should provide a sound basis for 
local authorities1 forward planning of capital programmes and for 
the focussing of resources on needs (Department of Environment, 
1986, para 6.8). 
3.3.2 The Reform of the Capital Expenditure Control Svstem 
1981/82 
A major reform of the control system for capital expenditure was 
introduced by the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 
which established the basic system which is operative at the 
present time. Prior to the financial year 1981/2 control was 
exercised indirectly via a 'loan sanction1 system which limited 
local authorities' borrowing to finance capital spending. Such 
spending was classified into three categories (Audit Commission, 
1985). Firstly, the 'key sector1 included major capital items in 
the main services (e.g. housing, education, transport, police) 
for which specific approval was required. Secondly, the 
'subsidiary sector1 included expenditure on land for key sector 
projects and on slum clearance and housing renovation grants for 
which general consent to borrow was given by means of circulars. 
Thirdly, the 'locally determined sector1 included all other 
capital schemes and was covered by block borrowing approval~from 
which all capital expenditure not financed by other means (e.g. 
from capital receipts, revenue contributions, capital funds, 
repairs and renewal funds, capital grants) had to be met. Local 
authorities were free to determine priorities within this sector 
and there was a 10% flexibility from year to year. 
The Government became unhappy about this system of control for 
two main reasons. First, there was a lack of precision and some 
unpredictability in the timing of the impact of borrowing 
approvals on PSBR. Second, as the importance of non-loan finance 
in capital expenditure increased (e.g. Capital receipts, repairs 
and renewals funds, grants from other authorities) so Government 
influence over such expenditure declined. Thus, between 1974/5 
and 1981/2 the proportion of total local authority capital 
expenditure in England funded from borrowing decreased from 84.3% 
to 50.8% (Travers, 1986, p. 138-9; Watt, 1982, p. 91; Department 
of Environment, 1986, para. 6.9). 
This system was replaced in 1981/2 by a new system which limits 
the amount of actual expenditure in any year, however financed. 
The Government issues local authorities with allocations for each 
year relating to service blocks. Initially there were five 
blocks: housing, education, transport, personal social services 
and other services; in 1984 a sixth block for Urban Aid was 
added. Allocations are issued following the submission of 
expenditure plans by authorities to the relevant central 
departments and authorities are also provided with indications of 
likely allocations for future years to aid forward planning 
(although these are not binding). Authorities are allowed 
flexibility, firstly, by unlimited virement between blocks within 
the total limit; secondly, by carrying forward from one year to 
the next up to 10% of a year's total allocation; thirdly, by 
supplementing allocations from capital receipts and profits from 
trading undertaking (within rules set down by the Secretary of 
State); and, finally, by transferring any part of their 
allocations to other local authorities (Audit Commission 1985, 
Appendix A) . 
However, the Government has taken steps to reduce this 
flexibility and increase control over gross capital spending by 
placing limits on the amount of capital receipts which 
authorities may apply in any one year. For example, for 1983/4 
authorities were restricted to the use of 50% of receipts from 
the sale of houses and 50% of non-housing receipts; these 
proportions have subsequently been reduced to 20% and 30% 
respectively, although certain 'non-prescribed' receipts can 
still be used in full. However, a 'cascading principle* applies 
to the use of receipts such that the prescribed proportion can be 
used in the first year and the same proportion of what remains in 
each subsequent year (ibid). 
3.3.3 Criticisms of the Svstem 
The system for capital expenditure control has been subjected to 
serious criticisms, notably as a result of an investigation by 
the Audit Commission (1985). First, the system is deficient in 
the Government's own termebecause it has failed to achieve the 
objective of controlling capital expenditure in relation to 
broader public expenditure planning. After initial 
underspending, local authoritiesg capital spending, in both'gross 
and net terms, has been in excess of planned levels in each year 
since 1983/4. The Government has therefore cut back the national 
total of allocations but an important reason for the overspending 
has been the large amount of capital receipts accruing to local 
authorities from the disposal of assets, particularly from the 
sale of council houses. Hence, as indicated above the Government 
has acted to control the application of capital receipts. 
However, the effect of these measures has been to reduce the 
scope for directing allocations to areas of greatest need and to 
reduce the incentive to dispose of surplus assets (Department of 
Environment, 1986, para. 6.15-6.17; Audit Commission, 1985, p. 
11-15). 
The problem relates to the conflicting nature of the Governmentgs 
objectives for the system (outlined above p. 17). In attempting 
to achieve objectives which are not mutually consistent the 
Government has made the system highly complex and subject to 
short-term corrective measures which has increased the 
uncertainty faced by local authorities in their planning of 
capital expenditure and produced inefficiencies in the 
implementation of capital programmes (Department of Environment, 
1986, para. 6.18; Audit Commission, 1985, p. 16-24). The problem 
is exacerbated by the short-term focus of the system which makes 
it difficult for authorities to plan ahead with any confidence 
(ibid, p. 37-40). 
The Audit Commission also found that the system imposes 
significant constraints on local flexibility and autonomy: 
It. central government officials, operating with inevitably 
limited and often out-of-date information, and lacking 
detailed local knowledge cannot be expected to be better 
judges of local needs and priorities than members 
accountable to the local electorategg. 
(op. cit., p. 37) 
The degree of central control exercised means that local 
authorities lack the incentive to tap new sources for capital 
funding. This arises, in particular, from controls on the use of 
capital receipts but is exacerbated by controls on revenue 
expenditure which can both inhibit certain types of capital 
spending (due to their revenue implications) and reduce the scope 
for funding certain types of capital expenditure from revenue 
(ibid., p. 37, 41-5). This means that local authorities have 
less autonomy and flexibility to determine local priorities and 
to direct resources effectively to local needs. This objective 
is clearly subordinated to that of controlling capital spending 
in accordance with national cash limits and the result has been a 
rundown in capital assets due to the inadequacy of capital 
investment in, for example, roads, schools and renovation of 
council housing (ibid., p. 24-32). 
The Audit Commission concluded that the weaknesses inherent in 
the present system represent It... serious obstacles to securing 
local economy, efficiency-and effectivenessgg (op. cit., p; 47). 
They made various recommendations for reform including a 3-5 year 
planning horizon, adequate provision for depreciation of fixed 
assets, encouragement for authorities to rely less on borrowing 
to finance capital spending, less central involvement in local 
programmes, continued incentives for authorities to dispose of 
under-utilised assets and a simplification of the system 
particularly the relationship between revenue and capital 
expenditure (ibid., p. 49). The Commission also suggested that 
some relaxation of present controls may be necessary and local 
authorities have argued more forcefully for fewer controls 
arguing that controls on revenue expenditure should be sufficient 
for the Government's purposes and, failing that, controls only on 
new borrowing for capital finance (Department of Environment, 
1986, para. 6.20). However, the Government has re-asserted its 
intention to retain controls on capital spending and has 
considered reforming the system so as to improve the degree of 
control over gross expenditure. This would be achieved by 
specifying the amount of capital receipts that authorities were 
permitted to use in any year and providing for a limited 
supplementing of capital expenditure from revenue (Department of 
Environment, 1986, paras. 6.19-6.51). These proposed reforms 
have not been implemented pending the reform of the wider system 
of local government finance, but the Government has taken steps 
recently to prevent local authorities circumventing the present 
controls using 'innovative' devices such as advanced and deferred 
purchase (or 'covenant') schemes. 
3.4 Conclusion - Further Pro-oosals for Reform 
This review of changes in central government controls on local 
authorities' expenditure, both current and capital, since 1979 
has demonstrated the concern of the Government to achieve an 
effective system of control and has indicated that this concern 
has been underpinned by both economic and political objectives. 
It has also indicated, that the degree of control actually 
achieved by central government has been far from complete and 
local authorities' spending has not fallen totally into line with 
the Government's plans. However, the Government has developed 
new proposals for radical changes in the system of local 
government finance and these proposals can be analysed in terms 
of the extent to which they enhance the Government's prospects of 
increasing control over local authorities' expenditure. 
The central argument underlying the Government's proposals 
relates to 'local accountability' (Department of Environment, 
1986). It is argued that the present system for financing 
current expenditure involving block grant and domestic and non- 
domestic rates, with a significant proportion of people being 
exempted from paying domestic rates, fails to promote 
accountability of local authorities to the local electorate and 
encourages high spending by authorities (op. cit. Chapter 1). 
Basically, it is argued that authorities have little incentive to 
control spending, firstly, because a significant proportion of 
marginal increases in spending falls on non-domestic ratepayers 
who do not have a vote and, secondly, because a large proportion 
of people who do have a vote are exempted from any contribution 
towards increased spending (or pay only a proportion) due to the 
rate rebate scheme. Moreover, the burden on domestic ratepayers 
due to increased spending--is less in areas with low ratealjle 
values due to the resource equalisation mechanism in the block 
grant system (ibid.). The implication of the Government's 
argument is that councils in northern urban areas are only weakly 
accountable to their electorates and that this explains the 
concentration of 'overspending' authorities in such areas. 
The stated intention of the Government's proposed reforms then, 
is to establish a clearer and more direct relationship between the 
spending behaviour of authorities and the change in tax burden on 
local voters (ibid., para. 1.54). The proposals comprise three 
main elements. First, domestic rates are to be replaced by a 
flat-rate 'community charge' (i.e. poll tax) to be levied on all 
adults (i.e. persons aged 18 years and over); all adults within a 
local authority area will face the same charge. Second, non- 
domestic rates will be changed from a tax levied at variable 
rates by different local authorities into a uniform national 
business rate which will be index-linked with the proceeds 
distributed to local authorities on an equal amount per adult 
basis. Third, the grant system will be simplified with the 
conversion of the present block grant system into two lump-sum 
grants: a 'needs grant' to compensate for differences in 
assessed spending needs per adult between authorities; and a 
'standard grant' providing an additional contribution from 
national taxation towards the cost of local services, again 
distributed on a per adult basis. Moreover, needs assessment 
will be undertaken on the basis of a simplified approach to 
assessing GREs (Department of Environment, 1986; Gibson, 1987). 
In the proposed system, authorities would receive a fixed sum at 
the start of the financial year comprising the needs and standard 
elements of grant and a portion of national business rate income. 
This allocation from central government (which is likely to 
constitute about 70-80% of revenue for most authorities) will be 
invariant with authorities' spending levels; income from the poll 
tax will make up the remaining required revenue and the full cost 
of marginal increases in spending (and the full benefit of 
marginal decreases) will be felt by local domestic taxpayers. 
There will be a 'gearing effect' from marginal increases in 
spending to increases in the poll tax which will depend on the 
proportion of an authority's total spending supported by the 
central government allocation; many authorities will find that a 
10% increase in spending will require something like a 50% 
increase in the poll tax. Since this tax is levied on a simple 
per capita basis and since it is likely that all adults will have 
to pay at least a 20% contribution (following the Social Security 
Act 1986), it would appear that lower income people will lose out 
significantly from the Government's reforms. 
There will also be an inter-regional redistributive effect due to 
the ending of the resource equalisation mechanism in block grant 
based on rateable values. Thus, authorities with relatively low 
rateable resources (mainly in northern England) will lose out 
while those with high rateable resources (mainly in southern, 
eastern and central England) will gain. This effect will be 
magnified to the extent that the spending of authorities in 
northern England (particularly in urban areas) tends to be high 
relative to GRE and non-domestic rates are above the national 
average; consequently, they will lose out in allocation of the 
uniform business rate. However, safety nets will be appli-ed to 
moderate these changes and spread their impact over a period of 
years (Department of Environment, 1986, Ch. 5). 
If implemented these proposals are likely, therefore, to have two 
major implications. First, they should serve to constrain the 
spending of local authorities, particularly those in the northern 
urban areas which have proved to be the most difficult to control 
under the existing system of local government finance. This 
would serve the interests of the Treasury in controlling state 
spending in order to promote capital accumulation and would 
undermine the political challenge to the Government from Labour- 
controlled councils in these areas. 
The second main implication will be a re-distribution of 
the burden of financing local government spending. Areas in 
southern, eastern and central England will gain mainly at the 
expense urban areas in northern England. The main groups to 
benefit will be business and commerce in high rate poundage/low 
rateable value authorities (mainly in the north) and higher 
income people who will gain both from the replacement of domestic 
rates by the poll tax (i.e. especially in high rate poundage 
authorities) and from the abolition of resource equalisation on 
the basis of rateable value (i.e. especially in high rateable 
value regions). These changes will benefit the process of 
capital accumulation by controlling business costs and increasing 
disposable incomes for the better-off, and there are political 
implications in terms of the patterns of political support 
amongst such groups. The main losers will be lower income people 
particularly in northern urban authorities with high rate 
poundages and low rateable values. 
4. The Financinu of Local Transvortation Exvenditure 
4.1 Introduction 
Local authorities play an important role in the provision of 
transport infrastructure and services, accounting for over half 
of the Department of Transport's total budget. Within total 
local authority spending, transportation accounts for a 
relatively modest proportion of current expenditure (about 7%, 
the main components being road maintenance, public transport 
revenue support and concessionary fares) but a more significant 
proportion of capital expenditure (about 19%, mainly on road 
construction and improvement) (HM Treasury 1987, Table 3.8). 
Historically, there is a long tradition of special central 
government financial assistance to local authorities for 
transport expenditure over and above the general support 
arrangements which have existed in various forms since 1929 
(Bennett, 1982, Ch. 3). The basis for such Ispecific' and 
'supplementary' grant arrangements has been the argument that 
part of transport expenditure undertaken by local authorities is 
of more than purely local significance and that central 
government has an interest in ensuring the continuity of good 
standard facilities between local authority areas linking the 
national road network and public transport system (Department of 
Environment, 1975, p. 103). Relatively close links have 
developed, therefore, between central and local government in 
respect of the financing of local transportation expenditure and 
this relationship is of considerable interest in the context of 
the wider development of ideas about central-local relations. 
At the outset it is worth considering briefly the stated 
objectives of the Government for local transport. As regards 
expenditure on local roads the objectives are to enable local 
authorities within cost-effective limits, to maintain and improve 
their roads: 
(a) to meet growing business and other traffic and so reduce 
costly delays and accidents; and 
(b) to provide safe and convenient facilities for cyclists and 
pedestrians, and to improve the environment. 
As regards local public transport the objectives are: 
(c) to promote the provision of convenient and reasonably priced 
public transport at lower cost to the taxpayer by 
encouraging competition between operators in both the public 
and private sector; 
(d) to enable provision by authorities at their discretion for 
the support of socially necessary local bus services and for 
transport concessions for elderly and disabled people, and 
for children and young people in full-time education; 
(e) to provide for authorities to meet the needs of publicly 
owned bus companies for externally financed investment. 
. 
(Department of Transport, 1987) 
These objectives have evolved as part of the present Government's 
broader approach to economic and social reform and clearly 
reflect concerns with reducing the cost of the public sector, and 
increasing competition and the role of the private sector, and 
indicate a priority to the needs of business within public sector 
provision. Thus, the major transport aim of the Government is to 
It... increase consumer choice, and efficiency, by policies to 
increase competition and to decrease the role of the public 
sectorvr. (ibid. para. 1). The degree of change in approach from 
the previous Government can be illustrated to some degree by 
comparing the above transportation objectives with those set out 
in the Labour Governmentrs 'Transport Policy1 Green Paper 
published in 1976, which were: 
(a) to maintain a safe and efficient transport system which 
provides good transport facilities at lowest cost in terms 
of the resources used; 
(b) to give high priority to the social welfare aspects of 
transport, and in particular to the public transport needs 
of those without access to a car; 
(c) to protect and relieve the community from the unwarranted 
impact of transport on the environment; 
(d) to secure the efficient use of scarce resources, notably 
energy ; 
(e) to leave as much freedom of choice as possible to both users 
and to democratic decision; 
(f) to ensure that the changes ahead are accomplished in the 
context of full trade union involvement; 
(g) to recognise the need to restrain public expenditure and in 
particular to confine subsidy to the areas of greatest need. 
(Department of the Environment, 1976, Ch. 3) 
These objectives do indeed reflect the concern of the Labour 
Government in 1976 with restraining public expenditure in the 
context of the IMF assistance to deal with the economic crisis of 
the mid 1970s (see above, Section 2.1). However, certain points 
of contrast with the present Government's objectives can be 
highlighted. First, the concept of 'lowest cost in resource 
terms1 has been replaced by 'lowest cost to the taxpayerr 
indicating greater concern to reduce public spending and a 
conviction that resource consumption is a matter for the market 
and not for planning. Second, within public provision priorities 
have changed away from social welfare considerations and towards 
efficiency, cost-effectiveness and providing for the needs of the 
economy. Third, with the change of perspective which has 
elevated the role of the market above planned provision for 
social needs, the concept of 'needv has changed from one 
referring to socially-mediated standards of provision to one 
based on demand exercised in the market. Fourth, the 
vcorporatistl approach based upon consultation with the trade 
unions is no longer in evidence; this is consistent with the 
tendency of the present Government since 1979 highlighted by 
Rhodes (1984) towards less consultation in policy making and more 
'direction'. 
These broader changes in policy and ideology provide the context 
in which changes in the system of finance of local transportation 
expenditure should be studied. In this section we review the 
main features of this system and how it has evolved over time, 
consider various criticisms which havebeen made of the system, 
and outline other developments since 1979 which have a bearing on 
local authorities' approaches to local transportation expenditure 
and provision. 
4.2 The TPP/TSG Svstem 
4.2.1 The Reform of Local Transaort Finance 
Prior to 1974 a significant proportion of government financial 
help towards local authorities' transport provision was provided 
in the form of specific grants. The most important was the 75% 
grant towards the cost of building or improving principal roads 
but there were also infrastructure grants for public transport 
capital projects, new bus grants, grants for unremunerative rail 
services, rural bus and ferry grants and grants for 
transportation studies following the 1968 Transport Act. 
Financial assistance for other local authority transport 
expenditure (e.g. for road maintenance and administrative costs) 
was provided through the Rate Support Grant (House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee, 1973, para. 115-9, Department of 
Environment, 1973) . 
By the early 1970s there was mounting concern about this ' I . . .  
plethora of specific grants" (Mackie, 1980, p. 188) and 
particularly about the potential for bias in decision-making 
towards capital-intensive solutions. Such bias was seen as 
likely to be particularly important in urban areas, as witnessed 
by large urban motorway and rapid transit schemes, and to be 
resulting in serious misallocations of resources (Foster, 1973). 
Moreover, the system of specific grants was seen as inconsistent 
with the concept of comprehensive transport planning which had 
been behind the 1968 Transport Act and which the Government 
wished to promote (Department of Environment, 1973; Mackie, 1980, 
p. 188). Finally, the system involved too much detailed central 
supervision and control over individual schemes (Department of 
Environment, 1975, para. 5) . 
Consequently, in a context provided by the reform of local 
government, through the Local Government Act 1972 (implemented in 
1974), a new approach to financing local transport expenditure 
was seen as necessary in order to provide the new County Councils 
with the means to undertake their new responsibilities for 
integrated and co-ordinated planning of public and private 
transport in the wider context of land use planning (ibid., para 
6; Mackie, 1980). The approach adopted involved a supplementary 
block grant to 'top up' Rate Support Grant provision in respect 
of transportation expenditure, this supplementary grant to be 
paid on the basis of plans submitted by County Councils for 
scrutiny by the Department of the Environment (Department of 
Environment, 1975, para. 13-13) . 
The new system was introduced in 1975/6 with the following 
objectives: 
1. To promote the development and execution of comprehensive 
transport plans by the new County Councils and the GLC; 
2. To eliminate bias towards capital or current expenditure or 
towards particular forms of expenditure; 
3. To distribute central government grant in a way that 
reflects as far as possible the needs of individual areas; 
4. To reduce the degree of detailed supervision by central 
government over individual schemes. 
(Mackie, 1980, p. 188). 
The basis of the system was that the bulk of financial assistance 
from central government for local authority transport 
expenditure, previously distributed in the form of specific 
grants, would be partly absorbed into the needs element of rate 
support grant (RSG) and partly distributed through a Transport 
Supplementary Grant (TSG) payable to those authorities which 
satisfied the Secretary of State that their transport needs were 
not adequately covered by RSG. All County Councils were required 
to submit statements of Transport Policies and Programmes (TPPs) 
each year to the Secretary of State setting out their transport 
policies, detailed proposals for expenditure in the next 
financial year, an expenditure programme for five years ahead and 
a broader strategy for the longer term, and a statement of 
progress in implementing policies and meeting objectives. After 
examining the TPPs, and in the light of the resources made 
available for local authorities in the public expenditure 
planning process (cf. Section 3.2 above), the Secretary of State 
decides on each authority's 'Accepted Expendituren (AE) for the 
next financial year. TSG is then paid as a proportion of the 
amount by which AE exceeds a Ithresholdn which represents the 
level of financial support through RSG (ibid.; Department of 
Environment, 1973; Hepworth, 1984, p. 64-6). 
In formal terms the system can be expressed as follows: 
where TSGi is the Transport Supplementary Grant awarded to local 
authority i ; 
AEc is the accepted expenditure for local authority i ; 
p.i is the population of local authority i ; 
t is the threshold per capita ; 
r is the rate of grant. 
For example, the relevant figures applying to West Yorkshire 
County Council in 1978/79 were as follows (Mackie and Garton 
1979 p 12-13): 
AE; = #37.362 million 
P; = 2.078 million 
t = #9.992 per capita 
r = 0.70 
Therefore, the TSG awarded to WYCC was: 
TSGi = [37.362 - (9.992 x 2.07801 0.7 = J111.62 million 
It can be seen that the amount of TSG received by an authority is 
a function of its accepted expenditure, the value of the 
threshold, and the rate of grant. The values of these variables 
had to be adjusted by the Secretary of State so that the total 
TSG distributed conformed with the total finance available, which 
was a cash-limited sum deriving from the Government's public 
expenditure provisions. The value of the threshold was 
particularly important because it determined the balance of 
finance for local transport between Supplementary Grant on the 
one hand and RSG (in respect of current expenditure) and 
borrowing (for capital expenditure) on the other. The lower the 
threshold the greater the degree to which authorities1 transport 
expenditure would become eligible for TSG and therefore subject 
to the scurinty of the Secretary of State. Constraints on the 
total resources available for TSG could then be accommodated by 
adjustments in the rate of grant. In practice, the system was 
implemented with a threshold set sufficiently low such that most 
counties would qualify for TSG in order to ensure detailed 
scrutiny of authorities1 policies and programmes by the Secretary 
of State. TSG was then provided in the early years at about 70- 
75% of AE above threshold (Mackie 1980, p 188-9: Mackie and 
Garton 1979, p 8-13). 
In the new system as introduced in 1975/6, TSG covered both 
current and capital expenditure on public transport, highways, 
traffic regulation, parking provision and freight handling 
facilities. (Expenditure on new buses, concessionary fares, toll 
facilities, airports, harbours and canals was, however, 
excluded.) TSG was a block grant towards the whole 'accepted1 
programme (i-e. not tied to specific items) and the block loan 
sanction approved by the Secretary of State to cover the capital 
portion of AE was similarly unhypothecated. 
4.2.2 Critiaue of the TPP/TSG Svstem 
In the early years of the new system the Government issued 
financial guidelines for each authority within which they were to 
prepare alternative programmes, these guidelines being based upon 
the Government's broader public expenditure plans as set out in 
the annual Public Expenditure White Paper. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the Government of the day's stated intention that "... more responsibility for planning transport to meet local 
needs should be devolved to local government ...I1 (Department of 
Transport, 1978, para. 2) there was, in fact, a significant 
degree of central influence and control deriving from financial 
guidelines, central scrutiny of TPPs and decisions on thresholds 
and accepted expenditure. This control related essentially to 
two sets of interests. The first set was associated with the 
Treasury's drive to control public spending from the mid 1970s 
onwards which tended to contradict an important element in the 
logic of TPP/TSG system as originally devised relating to the 
encouragement of higher expenditure to meet certain objectives. 
The second set of interests was expressed in national transport 
policy considerations as mediated through the Department 6f the 
Environment and, from 1977, the Department of Transport. 
The controls deriving from the above interests created conflict 
and tensions between central and local government and revealed 
deficiencies in the system. The basic underlying issue is that 
of central government control versus local government autonomy 
and discretion in decision-making. As indicated earlier (see 
Section 3) developments in central-local government financial 
relations since the mid 1970s can be analysed in terms of the 
tension between, on the one hand, interests concerned to increase 
central control over local authorities and, on the other, a deep- 
seated tradition of 'local democracy1 in which a significant 
degree of local government autonomy is seen as having 
'constitutional1 status. This tension is expressed in the 
following justification of central control via the TPP system put 
forward by the Department of the Environment in the early days of 
the system: 
ll... government ... needs to ensure that it can exercise its 
proper responsibilities in the planning of local transport. 
Its role thus becomes one of providing the broad resource 
and policy context within which local discretion is 
exercised; overseeing the means by which authorities assess 
local needs and satisfy them by solutions which represent 
value for money; and exercising a co-ordinating role in the 
integration of national and local transport plans and in the 
securing of specific national transport policy objectives. 
The reconciliation of this role with the safeguarding of 
local government's independence cannot always be achieved by 
relying solely on exhortation and advice." 
(Department of Environment, 1975, para. 25) 
From this analytical perspective it is possible to identify a 
particular underlying problem in the TPP/TSG system. As 
indicated above the system was developed in a context when the 
promotion of national transport policy interests was an important 
consideration producing an orientation towards developing 
expenditure programmes in accordance with such interests. This 
is reflected in the discussions of the House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee (1973) in respect of the achievement of 
effective sanctions to implement national policy through the 
control mechanisms available to the Department of the Environment 
(ibid. paras. 131-47). However, the economic crisis in the mid 
1970s resulted in the subordination of central government 
departmental interests to Treasury control over public 
expenditure. Therefore, in the context of the TPP/TSG system, 
the emphasis changed, with the promotion of national transport 
policy objectives being subordinated to the control of local 
transportation expenditure. Thus, in their evidence to the 
Layfield Inquiry into local government finance in 1975, the 
Department of Environment stated that: 
"In the current circumstances the need to encourage 
transport plans which are economical in their demands on 
resources now looms larger than the original wish to 
encourage higher transport expenditure in particular cases.I8 
(Department of Environment, 1975, para. 15) 
.- 
This change in the balance of interests within central government 
produced implications for the way in which the TPP/TSG system 
worked and for relations between central and local government. 
If restraint of local transportation expenditure was to be 
achieved, local authorities should develop low-cost transport 
plans. However, such plans would result in expenditure bids more 
likely to fall below the threshold value and therefore, not 
attracting TSG. From the standpoint of any one authority, if 
other authorities were submitting relatively high bids in an 
attempt to maximise TSG entitlement, then it would not be in the 
interests of that authority to develop a 'good cheap plan' and 
thereby risk foregoing TSG altogether (ibid.). Therefore, to 
some extent high expenditure bidding is inherent in the system 
but this is clearly not consistent either with the objective of 
controlling expenditure or with the objective of directing 
resources effectively on the basis of need. Moreover, this 
feature of the system is a source of conflict between central and 
local government because, from the latter's standpoint, the 
credibility of the system, as a rational resource allocation 
mechanism relative to explicit needs and objectives, is 
undermined. 
Conflict deriving from central government pressure to control the 
level of expenditure has been exacerbated by trends towards 
greater central control over the distribution of expenditure 
arising from 'national policy' considerations. Of importance in 
this respect are interests mediated through the Department of 
Environment and, since 1977, the Department of Transport. Mackie 
(1980, p. 201) quotes a senior government official's 
rationalisation of this aspect of government control: 
'I... the Department, responding to national considerations, 
is bound to seek to influence local authorities to ensure 
that expenditure is consistent overall with the PESC 
provision. 
The conflict between central and local government has been most 
evident in the field of public transport policy (Mackie, 1980; 
Mackie and Garton, 1979). In the first year of the system, local 
authorities received positive guidance in relation to public 
transport revenue support measures but this was quickly 
overturned in the context of the Government's response to the 
economic crisis with the decision in 1975 that bus and 
underground subsidies were to be reduced by 50% in real terms 
within three years. However, the review of policy, published in 
the 1977 Transport Policy White Paper, resulted in a further 
revision, with a renewed commitment to public transport; only a 
small reduction in subsidies in metropolitan areas was now 
proposed and there would be a modest increase in support for 
rural services (Department of Transport, 1978, 1979). With the 
election of the Conservative Government in 1979 the direction 
changed again with an increasing degree of scrutiny being placed 
on revenue support expenditure (Department of Transport, 1981, 
1982). Authorities were required initially to justify revenue 
support proposals more rigorously and the Government indicated 
that it was not prepared to accept proposals for subsidies 
intended to implement generalised low fares policies (op. cit. 
1982, para. 10). 
. 
The Government's policy on public transport revenue support 
brought it into serious conflict with local authorities in London 
and the metropolitan areas. In 1977/78 South Yorkshire County 
Councills revenue support proposals found disfavour with the 
Labour Government, but the latter's response was to accept only a 
small amount of expenditure for TSG, allowing the Authority 
discretion to finance its policy from rates if it so wished. 
However, the Conservative Government's approach in 1982/3 was 
more draconian. Following the successful legal challenge by 
Bromley Borough Council to the GLCs 'Fares Fair' policy, the 
Government introduced the 1983 Transport Act which gave the GLC 
and Metropolian Counties 'Protected Expenditure Limits1 (PELs) 
for revenue support, such that expenditure above the PELs would 
be open to legal challenge (Department of Transport, 1983). The 
concern to reduce spending on public transport subsidies, 
particularly in the metropolitan areas, can also be seen as an 
important factor in the Government's modifications to the block 
grant system (especially the target and penalty system), 
introduction of rate-capping and, eventually, abolition of the 
GLC and Metropolitan Counties (see above section 3.2). This 
concern to reduce local authorities' spending on public transport 
revenue support is consistent with the interpretation of 
Government policy since the late 1970s as directed at both 
reducing the overall burden of state spending on capital 
accumulation and re-ordering the composition of state spending so 
as to give higher priority to programmes assisting the process 
of capital accumulation and lower priority to programmes 
assisting social welfare. 
These developments will be considered at greater length in the 
next section but meanwhile it is appropriate to consider other 
criticisms which have been directed at the TPP/TSG system and 
reforms to the system which have been introduced since 1979. As 
regards other criticisms, the review by Mackie of the operation 
of the system up to 1979 points up various drawbacks in addition 
to those referred to above (Mackie, 1980; Mackie and Garton, 
1979). In particular, he points to deficiencies arising from 
problems of forecasting revenue expenditure, the annual basis of 
TSG settlements and lack of longer term financial guidance and 
the absence of an objective basis for demonstrating need and 
ensuring that resources are allocated to meet priority needs. He 
is also critical of the degree of central government intervention 
in local decision-making on the grounds that it blurs 
responsibility for local transport expenditure decisions, it 
reduces the scope for learning from diversity within local 
government, and it discriminates against authorities with open 
policy differences with central government compared with those 
who operate 'through the back door' (Mackie, 1980, p. 198-202; 
Mackie and Garton, 1979, p. 37-51). 
4.2.3 Towards Reform of the TSG System 
On taking office in 1979, the Conservative Government retained 
the TPP/TSG system subject to a simplification in the procedure 
for submitting TPPs such that full TPPs were required only when 
changes in problems and policies made them necessary while, in 
intervening years, only summaries of changes and amendments and 
their relationship to policies, were required (Department of 
Transport, 1980). Howevel~;.during the early 1980s, there' 
developed criticism of the system and the way it was operating in 
the context of the Governmentls broader approach to local . 
government finance. The main forum for these criticisms was the 
annual consideration of the Governmentls expenditure plans for 
transport, as presented in the Public Expenditure White Paper, by 
the House of Commons Transport Committee, the first of which was 
undertaken in 1980 (House of Commons Transport Committee 1980- 
87). 
In their reports on the 1981 and 1982 Public Expenditure White 
Papers, the House of Commons Transport Committee commented on the 
severity of the cuts being imposed by the Government on local 
authorities1 transport programmes and focussed on two features in 
particular: first, the problems faced by local authorities in 
achieving cuts in public transport revenue support; and, second, 
significant underspending by local authorities on transport 
capital programmes relative to allocations under the new system 
of capital finance (see above Section 3.3). The Committee 
related these two problems in the following terms: 
"In view of the fact that local authority support for bus 
operations, in consequence of the phasing out of the New Bus 
Grant, will soon represent the only direct form of public 
subsidy for local bus services other than rebate on road 
fuel duty, the ability of local authorities to at least 
maintain the level of subsidy to bus operators is clearly 
crucial, in many cases, to the continued operation of many 
local bus services, and in most non-metropolitan areas the 
local bus services constitute the only public transport 
services of any consequence.I1 
(op. cit., 1981, para. 33) 
I1Against the background of a significant cut-back in their 
expenditure programmes for transport, local authorities have ... been faced with increased demands for support from 
public transport operators whose financial position has 
deteriorated, partly as a result of the recession and 
consequential loss of traffic." 
(op. cit., 1982, para. 44) 
"The possibility that local authorities may feel free to 
make a choice in favour of public transport subsidies, with 
consequent further reductions in total capital expenditure, 
is heightened by their freedom to transfer central 
government support for local transport expenditure, under 
the present Transport Supplementary Grant arrangements, from 
capital to current expenditure, regardless of the projected 
balance of expenditure shown in County Transport Policies 
and Programme bids. 
(op. cit., 1981, para. 33) 
The Committee therefore expressed dissatisfaction with the way in 
which the TPP/TSG was working because it failed to give local 
authorities an incentive to achieve planned capital expenditure 
targets. They expressed the view that the system should be 
reformed so as to provide-such an incentive whilst ensuritig 
adequate provision for current expenditure (op. cit., 1982, 
1983). 
It would appear that, in coming to their views on the need to 
reform the TPP/TSG, the Transport Committee was increasingly 
influenced by the submissions on this matter by the British Road 
Federation (BRF). In 1983 and 1984 the BRF made submissions to 
the Committee outlining criticisms of the system, primarily on 
the grounds that it contributed to capital underspend by local 
authorities, and proposing reforms to redress this problem 
(British Road Federation, 1983A, 1984). It is appropriate to 
consider the BRF1s criticisms in more detail. 
The BRF argued that during a period (1981-83) when the Government 
had been concerned to restrain local authorities1 current 
expenditure whilst increasing the provision for capital 
expenditure, local authorities1 response had been to continue to 
increase current spending whilst reducing considerably capital 
expenditure (BRF, 1983B, p. 3-4). In part, the problem was seen 
as due to the cuts in Government grant and the operation of the 
block grant/penalty system making local authorities reluctant to 
incur additional interest charges on their current accounts which 
would accrue from borrowing to finance capital projects. 
However, the main fault was seen to lie in the TSG system due to 
the lack of correlation between the level of TSG awarded and the 
balance of current and capital expenditure in 'accepted 
expenditure' and due to the discretion of local authorities to 
use TSG as they wished once it was awarded. In the context of 
the Governmentls broader financial controls, therefore, capital 
expenditure was suffering particularly in the Shire Counties which 
were left to finance a higher proportion of capital spending by 
borrowing than were the GLC or Metropolitan Counties (ibid., p. 
7-8). 
The BRF proposed that TSG should be retained but should be 
applicable only to capital expenditure, with all local 
authorities1 transport current expenditure receiving support 
through block grant. They proposed that standards for public 
transport provision and road maintenance should be drawn up to 
ensure the protection of these items of current expenditure. The 
Government should provide an indication of likely future levels 
of TSG in order to ourage better forward planning by local 
authorities. Also, interest charges on borrowing for capital 
spending should be disregarded from relevant current expenditure 
and, therefore, from block grant abatement calculations, and tax 
changes should be introduced to reduce interest costs faced by 
local authorities (ibid., p. 8-14). 
In their 1984 report on the Public Expenditure White Paper, the 
House of Commons Transport Committee (1984) explicitly supported 
the proposal to restrict TSG to capital expenditure and also 
proposed that the Government should give a firmer commitment to 
local authorities in respect of the capital allocations for road 
construction likely to be available in future years. In October 
1984, a Department of Transport circular announced the 
Governmentls decision to restrict TSG payments from 1985/86 to 
capital expenditure on highways and traffic regulations. The 
reason for this decision was stated as follows: 
"TSG was intended to support local transport expenditure 
generally. But in recent years authorities have spent more 
on transport revenue expenditure (particularly on public 
transport revenue support) than provided in the Government's 
public expenditure plans, while they have underspent the 
provision for transport capital expenditure. The Government 
wishes to concentrate the extra support provided through TSG 
on highways capital expenditure which is of more than local 
importance, in particular investment on roads which form 
part of the primary route network of major through routes, 
important urban roads, and bypasses and relief roads which 
relieve communities of the effects of heavy through 
traffic. I' 
(Department of Transport, 1984, para 2) 
Therefore, from 1985/86 TSG was no longer available to support 
any current expenditure nor capital expenditure on car parks, the 
provision of facilities for handling freight to be carried 
otherwise than by road, and facilities for public transport (the 
latter now being eligible only for grants under 556 of the 1968 
Transport Act in respect of large projects). Compensating 
arrangements were made in block grant to provide support for all 
current expenditure on transport via RSG (ibid. paras 3-7). 
This reform of TSG can be seen as consistent with the 
Government's broader policies in relation to the control of local 
government expenditure, being designed explicitly to help in the 
control of local authorities1 current expenditure on public 
transport revenue support (which relates mainly to 'social 
welfare1 objectives) while promoting capital expenditure on 
roads, especially those of 'more than local importance', which 
can be seen as promoting the Government's stated objective of 
providing benefits to 'industry and other road users' (cf. 
Department of Transport 1987, p. 16; see also above section 4.1). 
The reform renders the larger part of local authority transport 
expenditure subject to tighter control within the context of the 
block grant system while providing the Government with a greater 
degree of control over the distribution of local transportation 
expenditure. Therefore, the reform is consistent with the 
broader thrust of policies designed to promote capital 
accumulation both by restraining public expenditure and by 
influencing its composition in favour of that contributing to the 
well-being of the private sector at the expense of that 
contributing to social welfare objectives. 
In fact, the evidence suggests that the problem of local 
authorities underspending on highway-related capital expenditure 
may have been exaggerated. Table 4.1 presents data from the 
Government's Public Expenditure White Papers on capital 
expenditure provisions and outturns in England between 1981/82 
(the first year of the reformed capital control system) and 
1986/87. The underspend on the total of local authority capital 
expenditure declined from 12% in 1981/82 to 2% in 1983/84 while 
overspending occurred in 1984/5 and 1985/6. Provisional figures 
for 1986/7 indicate a small underspend but this could change 
since outturn figures usually exceed provisional. Taking roads 
and car parks together, the.only significant underspend was in 
1981/82, the first year of the new system when, the Government 
has acknowledged, authorities were adjusting to the new system 
(cf. Department of Environment 1986 para 6.16); since 1984/85 
there has been a slight overspend. Spending on roads alone has 
indeed been consistently below provision, but the margin of 
between -2% and -8% since 1982/83 can hardly be seen as a drastic 
problem. 
The discussion in section 3.3 above indicated some difficulties 
which local authorities have faced under the system of capital 
expenditure controls introduced in 1981/82, particularly due to 
the short-term focus of the system, the constraints on local 
flexibility and autonomy and frequent changes in direction by the 
Government to attempt to correct perceived over- or under- 
spending. In addition, controls on revenue expenditure, and 
grant penalties for over-spending, have affected capital spending 
because of the revenue implications of capital projects (cf. 
running costs and debt charges). These difficulties 
notwithstanding, the main problem for the Government on capital 
spending since 1983/84 has been one of controlling 0vers~endinq 
and measures have been taken, for example, to limit the 
application of capital receipts in any one year, in addition to 
the overall reduction in the provision for capital expenditure. 
Thus, between 1983/4 and 1986/7 the provision for local transport 
capital expenditure was reduced by 22%; the total capital 
allocation was reduced by 17%, implying a reduction in the 
assumed application of capital receipts of 79%. In every year 
from 1981/82 to 1985/86 total capital expenditure on local 
transport in England exceeded the capital allocation, the 
underspending against provision up to 1983/84 being due to the 
shortfall of actual capital receipts applied to local transport 
against the amount assumed by the Government. In the light of 
these considerations, the problem of discrepancy between 
expenditure outturns and provisions would appear to have been 
somewhat overstated and, in any case, such discrepancies can be 
seen as unremarkable in the context of the control system as it 
currently operates. 
In a submission to the House of Commons Transport Committee in 
the context of the consideration of the Government's 1985 Public 
Expenditure White Paper, the Association of County Councils was 
indeed critical of the Government's focus on controlling 
overspending when there was an underspend on local highways: 
'I... roads projects are still subject to the same 
paraphenalia of 'voluntary restraint' and tightening control 
over capital receipts, control mechanisms which simply tend 
to exacerbate the underspending. Revenue targets and grant 
penalties further inhibit capital expenditure." 
(Association of County Councils 1985, para 11) 
It is instructive to bear in mind the wider policy context in 
which the reform of TSG took place and, in particular, the other 
local transportation reforms introduced in the 1983 and 1985 
Transport Acts and the changes to the structure of local 
government implemented in the 1985 Local Government Act. 
Underlying these reforms was the concern on the part of the 
Government, in particulari-,to reduce expenditure on public 
transport revenue support by local authorities, especially those 
Table 4.1 
Transport Capital Expenditure Outturn 
for Enalish Local Authori 
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Source: Public Expenditure White Papers 1982-1987 (H M Treasury 1982 
in the metropolitan areas, such expenditure being a significant 
element in the perceived profligacy of the metropolitan councils 
which figured prominently in the Government's argument for their 
abolition. These measures will be considered in more detail 
below but first it is appropriate to look briefly at criticisms 
which have been made of the reformed TSG system as it has 
operated since 1985/86. 
In fact, a major criticism of the reformed TSG system which has 
been made by representatives of authorities in the metropolitan 
areas, is that it has resulted in a significant transfer of 
resources away from those areas thus reducing the ability of 
metropolitan authorities to address their transport problems and 
needs. This criticism has been made by West Yorkshire County 
Council (1985) and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(1987). Firstly, it is argued that the restriction of TSG to 
roads of 'more than local importance1 introduces a bias towards 
large schemes outside urban areas (particulary by-passes) and 
against smaller schemes to improve traffic management and safety 
on busy urban roads of the type which constitute a significant 
component of the highway programmes of metropolitan authorities. 
Secondly, the metropolitan authorities are concerned that the 
exclusion of investment in public transport facilities from TSG 
militates against the integrated assessment of public transport 
and highways solutions. Grants under 556 of the 1968 Transport 
Act are available only for schemes of exceptional merit and large 
enough for the costs to be spread beyond local users and rate 
payers; within the PTAs there will be new public transport 
infrastructure projects which would have been eligible for TSG 
but which will not attract S56 grants. Concern about the effect 
on public transport investment has also been expressed by the 
House of Commons Transport Committee (1985 para 36): 
I1Public transport contributes to the overall transport 
infrastructure of the country and we regret that 
progressively it is being viewed purely as a trading service 
and not as a suitable candidate for government investment.'I 
The third criticism from the metropolitan authorities relates to 
the compensating arrangements in the block grant system for the 
financing of highway maintenance and public transport revenue 
support. It is argued that such arrangements are inadequate to 
sustain transportation current expenditure in the metropolitan 
areas at a level required to meet needs (West Yorkshire County 
Council, 1985). As regards road maintenance, the House of 
Commons Transport Committee (1986) has expressed concern about 
the national situation. Thus, the Government increased the 
maintenance component of GRE in 1986/7 by 15% as a 'signal1 to 
local authorities to increase expenditure in this area but the 
level of block grant was the same in cash terms as in 1985/86 
(i.e. was reduced in real terms). The Committee considered, 
therefore, that the loss of TSG had not helped authorities to 
address the problem of deteriorating road conditions and actually 
recommended that the Government reconsider the use of TSG for 
road maintenance (ibid. para 47). As regards public transport 
revenue support, block grant arrangements for the metropolitan 
areas have been affected by the PELs imposed by the 1983 . 
Transport Act and the precept limitations imposed upon PTAs 
following the abolition of the Metropolitan Counties. The result 
of these provisions has been a signficant reduction in 
expenditure on revenue support in the metropolitan areas, in 
accordance with the Government's wishes. Thus, between 1982/83 
and 1985/86 support for public transport services in the 
metropolitan areas declined by about 15% in real terms compared 
with some 13% in shire areas. Whereas overspending in relation 
to Government provision for revenue support was 95% in 1983/4, 
this had been reduced to 28% on 1986/7 budgets. This situation is 
attributed by the Government primarily to the system of PELs and 
precept controls in the metropolitan areas (Department of 
Transport, 1987, p 37; see below section 4.3.2). 
Detailed analysis of available financial data will be required to 
determine the relative impact of the reform of the TSG system on 
expenditure in different programme areas in different types of 
authority and this will be undertaken in the second stage of the 
project. At this stage it is possible to indicate in broad terms 
the constraints imposed upon expenditure in the metropolitan 
areas. Thus, according to Department of Transport figures, 
between 1984/5 and 1985/6 total budgeted current expenditure for 
the metropolitan authorities on transport increased by 0.1% in 
cash terms compared with an increase of 3.1% in the shire areas: 
the respective figures for roads current expenditure were -9.5% 
(mets) and +2.6% (shires) and for public transport support -3.6% 
(mets) and +2.6% (shires). As regards capital expenditure the 
comparison between 1984/5 provisional outturn and 1985/86 
allocations also indicates pressure on the metropolitan 
authorities; for roads and car parks the mets show a decrease of 
27% while the shires show an increase of 4% (the respective 
figures for public transport capital being -14% and +39%) 
(Department of Transport 1986, Tables 5-6). The change in the 
distribution of TSG between different types of authority is shown 
in Table 4.2 below; these data indicate a relative shift in favour 
of the shire counties due to the reform of TSG in 1985/6 although 
the metropolitan areas and London have increased their share 
somewhat in more recent years. 
Table 4.2 
Distribution of TSG bv T m e  of Authoritv 
1984/5 to 1987/8 
London Authorities 35.4% 17.4% 19.7% 21.5% 
Metropolitan Authorities 26.5% 18.2% 22.9% 22.6% 
Shire Counties 38.1% 64.4% 57.4% 55.8% 
Total TSG f400m f 160m f 164m f180m 
Source: Rate Support Grant Reports 1984/5 to 1987/8 
Finally, it is worth referring briefly to certain criticisms 
which have been made of the broader system of capital expenditure 
controls as it affects local authorities1 transport expenditure; 
these criticisms echo those discussed in section 3.3 above. 
Thus, the Association of Municipal Engineers (1987) argue that 
the system of annual grant allocation militates against medium- 
term planning in respect of highways programmes, a criticism 
which figured prominently in the Audit Commissionts (1985) study. 
The AME also suggests that capital expenditure on roads suffers 
relative to other programmes because it is more difficult to 
evade the controls in roads programmes. A further argument, 
taken up by the House of Commons Transport Committee, and 
referred to in section 4.2.3 above, is that roads capital 
expenditure also suffers in the distinction drawn by the 
Government between net capital allocations on the one hand and 
gross capital provision on the other, the latter incorporating an 
assumption about the application of capital receipts (deriving 
from the sale of assets) to various block programmes. It is a 
matter for individual authorities to determine priorities between 
programmes for the use of capital receipts and it has become 
clear that, in general, transport programmes are not being 
augmented by receipts to the degree assumed by the Government: 
Highways do not generate large capital receipts themselves, 
and those services which do, e.g. education, tend to want 
them used for their own  purpose^.^^ 
(Association of Municipal Engineers, 1987, para 2.2) 
The HoC Transport Committee (1987) has commented, therefore, that 
if capital provisions for local roads are to be met ...I9 local 
authorities will have to give roads a high priority when 
allocating the receiptst1 (ibid, para 22). 
As indicated above it is important to consider the reform of the 
TPP/TSG system in the context of broader legislative measures 
introduced by the Government in recent years and we shall now 
consider briefly the main measures of relevance. 
4.3 Recent Lesislative Develo~ments 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The primary measures of relevance to our discussion are the 1983 
Transport Act, the 1985 Local Government Act and the 1985 
Transport Act. These measures, in turn, should be seen in the 
context of the Governmentls wider approach to economic, political 
and social reform which, as we have seen, is dominated by a 
primarily economic programme of fiscal restraint, cuts in the 
burden of public expenditure and direct taxation! privatisation 
and reductions in the degree of regulation to which enterprises 
are subject. In this programme, policies towards local 
government have assumed an important role involving: restraints 
on expenditure; measures to influence the distribution of local 
authority spending between services, in particular towards those 
which provide most direct support to the productive sector; 
measures to privatise certain local authority services and 
subject others to competikion from the private sector and- 
Ieconomic pricing9 of outputs; and measures to assume greater 
central control over certain discretionary areas of local 
authority activity. 
It has indeed been argued that ... lmnew legislation affecting 
local government has been passed at an unprecedented ratemm 
(Loughlin 1983, p. 283). The first major piece of legislation 
introduced by the Conservative Government following their 
election in 1979 was the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 
1980. In addition to the reforms of the system of local 
government finance which we discussed above in Section 3, this 
Act introduced competitive tendering for local authority Direct 
Labour Organisations (DMs), and required DLOs to account 
separately for their work and to achieve a prescribed rate of 
return on the capital they employ. This Act also required 
authorities to publish information about their finances in the 
form of an Annual Report and Accounts. Other legislation has 
included the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, 
which provided for public access to council meetings, reports and 
other documents, and the Local Government Act 1986 which placed 
restrictions on the form, style and content of publicity material 
that local authorities may produce, particularly with respect to 
material which might be considered likely to influence public 
support for any political party. This latter measure represented 
an initial response by the Government to the findings of the 
Widdicombe Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business 
which recommended several changes affecting the respective roles 
of councillors and officers in local government (Widdicombe, 
1986). 
4.3.2 The 1983 Transvort Act 
The context of the 1983 Transport Act was provided by the 
increasing concern on the part of the Government to restrain the 
spending of local authorities, in particular, a relatively small 
number of Imrecalcitrant high-spendersmm which included several 
London authorities and certain labour-controlled authorities in 
the provincial metropolitan areas. A particularly important area 
of contention between such authorities and the Government related 
to expenditure on public transport revenue support, with 
authorities such as the GLC and South Yorkshire and Merseyside 
Metropolitan Counties providing levels of subsidies significantly 
in excess of Government plans. As discussed in Section 3.2 
above, the system of expenditure targets and grant penalties and 
the abolition of the power of authorities to levy supplementary 
rates in the 1982 Local Government Finance Act were motivated by 
the increasing concern of the Government to curb spending in the 
Irecalcitrantm authorities. 
However, it was the legal challenge in 1981/2 by the 
Conservative-controlled London Borough of Bromley to the GLC1s 
low fares policy for public transport (which occasioned a 
supplementary rate precept demand) which represented the most 
significant development in relation to transport policy. The 
House of Lords found the GLC to be ultra vires under the 1969 
Transport (London) Act which was interpreted as requiring London 
Transport to be operated on 'sound business principlesm with 
subsidies paid only to cover unavoidable deficits. This 
judgement therefore calleb,into question the legality of any 
subsidies by local authorities for urban public transport 
(Mackie, 1987). Subsequently, there were legal challenges to the 
public transport policies of Merseyside and West Midlands 
Metropolitan County Councils both of which proposed supplementary 
rate precepts. However, while the West Midlands precept was 
quashed, Merseysidets was declared intra vires, it being found 
under the 1968 Transport Act that an authorityls power to make 
revenue support grants was not limited by an overriding duty on 
the transport undertaking to break even so far as practicable 
(Loughlin 1983, p. 283). 
In the legal confusion arising from these cases, the Government 
took the opportunity to introduce the 1983 Transport Act, 
ostensibly ... Itto provide a more stable basis for public 
transport planning and subsidies in the Metropolitan Counties and 
London" (Department of Transport, 1983). The Act required 
Passenger Transport Executives to prepare three-year plans 
analysing options for the development of public transport 
services and presenting justified proposals for service levels, 
fares and subsidies, indicating the benefits accruing from such 
subsidies. Subsidies could not be paid by the Passenger 
Transport Authority except on the basis of an approved plan and 
in the light of guidance from the Secretary of State, based upon 
his scrutiny of the plan. Such guidance specified a maximum 
level of revenue grant - a 'Protected Expenditure Levelt (PEL) - 
consistent with It... a proper exercise of the power to make such 
grants ...I1 (ibid, para 22). Authorities could provide grants 
above or below their PEL but any grant in excess of the PEL would 
be open to challenge in the courts. 
Therefore, in the 1983 Act the Government was able to secure a 
legal basis for measures to control local authority spending. The 
Secretary of State took the power to be arbiter on the legality 
of levels of subsidies provided by authorities and thereby was 
able to present the imposition of constraints on authoritiesn 
expenditure as justified by a rational legal framework rather 
than as an outcome of controversial economic and social policies. 
Thus, Loughlin (1986, p. 183-4) argues as follows: 
It... the Bill was promoted ostensibly to provide a clear and 
consistent legal framework for the payment of public 
transport revenue support grants whereas in fact it was 
designed to exploit the uncertainty in the fiduciary concept 
articulated in Bromlev in the hope that this would require 
local authorities to comply with Government guidelines ... II 
Loughlin has argued that, in fact, the fiduciary concept is 
anachronistic, representing an incursion of a private law concept 
into a public law area, is ambiguous and unworkable in relation 
to determining appropriate behaviour of local authorities, and is 
essentially being used by the Government to mask its economic and 
political objectives (Loughlin, 1983). 
Using the powers conferred by the 1983 Act, the Government has 
claimed some success in reducing overspending by local 
authorities on public transport revenue support (Department of 
Transport 1987, para 37; also see Section 4.3.4 above). As Table 
4.3 indicates, total expenditure on revenue support in England 
has remained relatively constant in cash terms between 1983/4 and 
1986/7 (a decline of 13% in real terms) and this picture applies 
in both the metropolitan areas and shire counties. The degree of 
overspend relative to the Government's provision has declined 
significantly from 95% in 1983/84 to 28% in 1986/87, this 
overspend being due entirely to the metropolitan authorities. 
However, this 'success' is due primarily to the increase in the 
Government's provision over the period - an increase of 50% in 
total and of 92% for the metropolitan authorities - rather than 
to reductions in actual spending. 
Table 4.3 
Public Transport Revenue Support in Enalish Metr0~0litan 
and Shire Authorities fexcludina London) 
)
1. Outturn Expenditure 
Metropolitan Areas 262 266 257 - (2) 
Shire Counties 9 1 9 4 8 9 - (2) 
Total 353 360 346 351 
2. Emenditure Provision 
Metropolitan Areas 9 0 128 150 173 
Shire Counties 92 9 5 97 100 
Total 182 223 247 273 
3. Protected Expenditure 
Level 220 227 206 - ( 3 )  
(I.) Provisional figures; (2) Not available; (3) Not applicable. 
Source: ~ackie (1987); Department of Transport (1987); H M 
Treasury (1987) . 
The actual impact of PELS between 1983/84 and 1985/86 is 
difficult to assess. The sum of PELs for the Metropolitan 
Counties in 1983/84 exceeded the Government's expenditure 
provision of some #I30 million reflecting It... the difficulties 
of adjusting rapidly to more balanced policies ... ' I (H M Treasury 
1983, p. 30). In total the PELs represented a reduction from 
1982/3 outturn of nearly 20% but the eventual 1983/4 outturn for 
the Metropolitan Counties was almost treble the Government's 
provision and exceeded the PELs by 19%. Nevertheless, the 
1983/84 outturn did represent a reduction in real terms (of 
3.6%) from 1982/83 and also represented a significant reduction 
from the Metropolitan Counties' original plans (H M Treasury 
1984, p. 45). For 1984/85 both provision and the PELs were 
increased, the latter still being significantly in excess of the 
former reflecting 'I... the-difficulty of quickly bringing-GLC and 
metropolitan public transport in line with the Government's 
policies" (ibid, p. 47). The 1984/85 outturn for the 
Metropolitan Counties was about double the Governmentls provision 
and exceeded the PEL by 17%; again, a slight real terms reduction 
over the previous year (c. 2%) was achieved. In 1985/86 the 
Government was still referring to problems in bringing the 
Metropolitan Counties into line (H M Treasury, 1985, p. 105) and 
the sum of PELs, although slightly reduced from 1984/5, exceeded 
provision by 37%, the latter itself having been increased from 
the previous year (by 17%). However, outturn expenditure in 
1985/86 by the Metropolitan Counties once again exceeded 
provision (by 71%) and the sum of PELS (by 25%), although it 
represented a small reduction in cash terms from the previous 
year. 
Therefore, although expenditure on public transport revenue 
support in the metropolitan areas was restrained over the period 
1983/84 to 1985/86, when PELS operated, (most notably in relation 
to original plans), authorities in these areas were still 
considered by the Government to be significantly 'out of line' in 
policy and expenditure terms in 1985. As Mackie (1987, p. 108) 
argues ' I . . .  the protected expenditure levels appear to have had 
only a limited effect." A major reason for this is that no legal 
action was taken against those authorities which exceeded their 
PELs (South Yorkshire and Merseyside) while most Metropolitan 
Counties were able to contain expenditure within their PELs 
(ibid). In fact, the House of Commons Transport Committee (1984, 
paras 31-2) stated its concern about the 'I... apparent 
irrelevance of the measures contained in the 1983 Transport 
Act ...I1 arising from the discrepancy between PELS and the 
Government's expenditure provisions: 
"... we find it most peculiar that the Government should 
appear to be sanctioning a level of expenditure which is 
totally at variance with its own targets as laid out in the 
White Paper and accepted under the TSG procedures" (ibid). 
Indeed, if the Government was primarily concerned to reduce 
overspending in relation to the PEWP expenditure provisions, then 
the establishment of PELs under the 1983 Act can be seen to have 
confused the issue and, in fact, to have frsutrated the 
Government's objective to some extent. This is because the 
designation of PELs in excess of provision resulted in 
'acceptance' of expenditure for TSG purposes in excess of the 
PEWP provisions. In outlining the role of TSG in supporting 
expenditure on revenue support in the context of the provisions 
of the 1983 Act, the Government referred to PELS rather than 
provisions: 
"The Government is not ... prepared to grant-aid the 
protected expenditure levels in full, and the revenue 
support expenditure for the metropolitan areas accepted for 
Transport Supplementary Grant will be less than the total of 
the provisional protected expenditure levels under the 
legislation." 
(H M Treasury 1983, p. 30) 
Therefore, in 1983/4 and 1384/5, before the reform of TSG; the 
Government grant-aided expenditure on revenue support by the 
Metropolitan Counties in excess of its own expenditure plans. 
For example in 1983/4 Accepted Expenditure on revenue support in 
these authorities was #169.1 million compared with the PEWP 
provision of #90 million; in 1984/5 the respective figures were 
#164.8 million accepted against #I28 million provision. 
This contradiction reinforces the conclusion about the apparent 
irrelevance of the 1983 Act. In fact, it is possible to argue 
that the Act represents a rather 'perverse' piece of legislation. 
As argued above, the Government can be seen to have legitimised 
the introduction of additional measures to control local 
authority spending with reference to the alleged need to clarify 
legal uncertainties; yet the controls introduced did not succeed 
in bringing the authorities in question into line with Government 
policy and, indeed, may have-actually confounded this objective 
to some extent. Moreover, the Act was soon overtaken by the 
Government's proposals to abolish the GLC and Metropolitan 
Counties, proposals which were implemented in the 1985 Local 
Government Act. The impending demise of these authorities may be 
one reason why no legal action was taken between 1983 and 1985 
against those which exceeded their PELS (Mackie, 1987, p. 109). 
4.3.3 The Abolition of the GLCs and Metro~olitan Counties 
The relatively high spending of the GLC and certain Metropolitan 
Counties (especially South Yorkshire and Merseyside) on public 
transport revenue support and their resistance to the 
Government's attempts to 'bring them into line1 with its policies 
in this respect, were important factors in the Government's 
decision to abolish these authorities. In the local elections of 
May 1981 four of the Metropolitan Counties experienced a change 
of political control from Conservative to Labour (Greater 
Manchester, Merseyside, West Midlands and West Yorkshire) while 
Labour control in South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and the GLC was 
strengthened. Subsequently, these authorities figured 
prominently in the Government's list of 'recalcitrant 
overspenders'. On the introduction of the system of expenditure 
targets and grant penalties in 1981/82 the Metropolitan Counties 
were collectively budgeting to overspend their targets by 19% and 
the London precepting authorities (GLC and ILEA) by 14% compared 
to a national (England) average of less than 6% (Smith and 
Stewart, 1985, p. 30). By 1984/5 the GLC/ILEA 'overspend' had 
increased to 29% while the Metropolitan Counties1 budgets were 
collectively 5% above their targets (the latter 'improvement1 was 
due more to a relaxation of targets than to expenditure 
restraint) (ibid). The GLC and South Yorkshire and Merseyside 
Metropolitan Counties were amongst those authorities selected for 
'rate-capping' in 1985/6 on the grounds that their total 
expenditure in 1984/5 exceeded their GRE by at least 20%. We 
have seen that in the case of South Yorkshire expenditure on 
public transport revenue support was an important factor in its 
overspending and resistance to the Government's policies. Thus, 
in 1984/85 such expenditure constituted some 42% of the 
authorityls total budget and was approximately six times the 
expenditure accepted by the Government for TSG purposes (SYCC 
Revenue Budget documents; Rate Support Grant Report 1984/5). 
The Conservatives' Manifesto for the 1983 General Election 
included the commitment to abolish the GLC and Metropolitan 
Counties and proposals were published in a White Paper 
'Streamlining the Cities' later in 1983 (Department of 
Environment, 1983). The Government's justification for abolition 
referred mainly to the need for economy in the public sector and 
the absence of a real practical role for the upper tier of local 
government in the metropolitan areas. The search for a 
'strategic role' by the upper tier authorities had resulted, it 
was maintained, in conflict, uncertainty and 'heavy and 
unnecessary burdens on ratepayers (ibid Ch. 1). In summary, the 
Government argued as follows: 
"The abolition of these upper-tier authorities will 
streamline local government in the metropolitan areas. It 
will remove a source of conflict and tension. It will save 
money, after some transitional costs. It will also provide 
a system which is simpler for the public to understand, in 
that responsibility for virtually all local services will 
rest with a single authority." 
I 
(ibid, para 1.19) 
The two issues of economy and conflict, therefore, figured 
prominently in the Government's thinking reflected in the 
particular concern with the ' I . . .  high level of spending ... II 
(ibid, para 1.16) by the Metropolitan Counties, and their 
tendency to If... promote policies which conflict with national 
policies which are the responsibility of central government ... II 
(ibid, para 1.12). As we have argued, these issues have been at 
the heart of the changing nature of central-local relations over 
the past decade and, therefore, the abolition of these 
authorities, eventually implemented in the 1985 Local Government 
Act, can be seen as consistent with, indeed an integral part of, 
the series of measures introduced, particularly from 1980 
onwards, to restructure those relations. Thus, commenting on the 
Government's abolition proposals, Flynn et a1 (1985, p. ix-x) 
argued as follows: 
"The proposals should be seen as an attempt by central 
government to gain further control of local government ... 
This centralization is part of a long-term trend towards a 
reduction in local autonomy and should be seen together with 
the Rates Act 1984, which gives the government control over 
rate levels, as a further important step along the road 
towards a completely unitary state within which a single set 
of policies are pursued.lW 
Indeed, the abolition of these authorities can be seen to follow 
logically from the Government's concern to control local 
authority spending, especially that related to 'social' 
objectives, and is consistent with the increasing focus on 
particular recalcitrant authorities in the reforms to the block 
grant system and introduction of targets and penalties and rate- 
capping. It also suggests the importance of the political 
dimension to the Government's programme for control of local 
government, a dimension which, we have argued, is of some 
considerable significance in more recent proposals for the reform 
of local government finance and the privatisation of local 
authority services (cf. section 3.4 above). 
Various critiques of the Governmentls abolition proposals 
concluded, in fact, that the main justifications used by the 
Government were ill-founded. For example, Coopers and Lybrand 
(1983) found that the Government had exaggerated the degree of 
overspending by the Metropolitan Counties and that relatively 
high expenditure growth in these authorities was partly accounted 
for by higher inflation affecting their services, higher needs 
for services than in other authorities and Government priorities 
for certain services (e-g. Police). As regards public transport 
revenue suooort which. it was acknowledaed. accounted for a larae - - ~ - - - - - -  - ~~ ss - -~ - 
proportion of the relative volume of the MCC1s 
expenditure, it was argued that subsidies in the majority of 
authorities had been shown by a DTp study to be producing 
positive net benefits, and that independent reviews had not found 
that MCC passenger transport undertakings were inefficient in 
comparison with other transport operations (ibid, ch. 3). These 
findings were supported in broad terms by Flynn et a1 (1985). On 
the other hand, the proposed new arrangements, involving many 
services administered by Joint Boards of the lower tier 
authorities (especially, police, fire and public transport, 
together making up over half of the MCC1s total expenditure) and 
others requiring joint committees, were criticised as reducing 
the scope for co-ordinated decision making, increasing the risk 
of conflict and reducing local accountability and control (ibid, 
p. 109-11). This conclusion was supported by Hampton (1987, p. 
201) who argued that the new joint bodies: 
It... will not enhance local accountability. Indirectly 
elected bodies tend to develop a corporate identity of their 
own which obscures the responsibility of their parent 
authorities, particularly when they receive precepting 
powers. Nor will a network of single-purpose bodies find it 
easy to co-ordinate services either with each other or with 
the services of the districts or boroughs. There will no 
longer be a policy forum, for example, for considering the 
common interests of police, transport and highway 
authorities. The longer-term tendency may be for the joint 
boards to develop into fully fledged special purpose 
authorities in the manner of the water authorities. In any 
event the abolition of the GLC and MCCs and the distribution 
of their major services to special purpose authorities and 
joint boards can only be intepreted as a weakening of the 
role of local government." 
Therefore, the Government's case for abolition on the grounds of 
'streamlining1, saving money, and enhanced public understanding 
has been subjected to severe criticism, reinforcing the 
conclusion that the enhancement of central control of local 
government was the real objective. Following the abolition of 
the GLC and MCCs at the end of March 1986, central government 
control over expenditure and policies in the metropolitan areas 
was enhanced by subjecting the joint boards to precept control 
for the first three years of their existence, this control 
resulting in the designation by the Government of maximum 
expenditure levels (ELs) for each passenger transport authority. 
This system therefore replaced the PELS of the 1983 Transport Act 
and indeed represented a strengthening of control over public 
transport expenditure sin-.the Secretary of State can now 
designate total permissible expenditure. The Government is using 
this power to reduce expenditure on public transport in the 
metropolitan areas as shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
Maximum Emenditure Levels for Passenaer Transport Authorities 
in Enaland 1986/7 to 1988/9 (#mill. outturn vricesl 
PTA Est Outturn EL Proposed EL Indicated EL 
1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9 
Greater Manchester 80.1 77.5 74.1 
Merseyside 81.5 76.3 67.7 
South Yorkshire 80.2 51.8 45.7 
Tyne and Wear 64.0 60.9 56.6 
West Midlands 56.4 55.1 55.1 
West Yorkshire 53.9 58.3 57.9 
All 416.1 379.9 357.1 307.8 
Source: Mackie (1987, p. 111); AMA (1987, p. 108). 
It can be seen that the ELs imply a significant reduction of some 
26% in public transport expenditure in the metropolitan areas 
between 1985/6 and 1988/9. However, particular Authorities 
experience more severe cuts, notably South Yorkshire (61%) and 
Merseyside (39%), the successor Authorities to the MCCs which, 
during the early 1980s, were most 'out of line' with the 
Government's policies for public transport revenue support. With 
the Secretary of State also having direct control over the 
expenditure of London Regional Transport, the Government now has 
direct control over about 80% of total expenditure on public 
transport revenue support in England (1986/7 estimated outturns). 
As Mackie (1987, p. 110-1) concludes : 
"... in 1979, the metropolitan authorities had full control 
over their passenger transport executives, with complete 
discretion as to their budgets. In 1987, local public 
transport in these areas is under the control of a joint 
board, the maximum precept level of which is set by the 
Secretary of State. London Regional Transport is controlled 
directly by the Secretary of State. A substantial loss of 
local control, accountability and discretion has therefore 
occurred in the metropolitan areas. In the shires no such 
loss has occurred." 
4.3.4 Dereaulation of Local Bus Trans~ort 
The objective of reducing expenditure by local authorities on 
public transport subsidies also lay behind the measures contained 
in the 1985 Transport Act to de-regulate local bus transport, 
allowing competition between operators in respect of services 
which can be provided on a commercial basis, and requiring local 
authorities to employ competitive tendering in respect of 
supplementary services whfch they wish to secure but which remain 
unprofitable (Department of Transport, 1985). However, there are 
also other important objectives behind this legislation 
reflecting the Government s broader programme of de-regulating 
economic activity and privatising public sector activity and 
assets. As a result of this legislation, local authorities are 
no longer able to undertake comprehensive, co-ordinated planning 
of public transport service levels and fares for the whole of 
their areas and this has undermined their ability to allocate 
resources to public transport to achieve particular social 
objectives. Thus, although concessionary fares schemes for the 
elderly, disabled and young people are permissible, general low 
fares policies to provide benefits for lower income people are no 
longer possible. Moreover, it is now difficult for authorities 
to plan public transport services with respect to the objective 
of minimising the social costs due to private vehicles use in 
urban areas (Mackie, 1987, p. 112-5). In general terms, 
therefore, the 1985 Act is consistent with the Government's 
broader programme for local government involving a reduction in 
the scope of the public sector, control of public expenditure, 
and the re-direction of public sector resources away from certain 
areas of 'social expenditure' and towards activities and services 
which can assist private sector profitability and capital 
accumulation. Together with the 1985 Local Government Act and 
the 1983 Transport Act it provides an important part of the 
backdrop against which the reforms to the TSG system in 1974 
should be considered. Moreover, as we have attempted to argue, 
these measures in turn should be examined within the context of 
the Government's broader programme of reform of local government 
finance and measures to reduce the size and scope of the public 
sector. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Since the late 19701s, therefore, there has been a considerable 
change in the political and financial context in which local 
transportation provision is made. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s local authorities accounted for nearly 60% of the 
expenditure falling under the central responsibility of the 
Department of Transport. This proportion is now down to about 
50%. In the early 1980s the upper-tier local authorities in 
london and the provincial metropolitan areas were responsible for 
about one half of total local government net expenditure on 
transport. These authorities have now been abolished. Of the 
total expenditure on transport which remains the responsibility 
of local authorities, the proportion which is subject to 
decision-making by directly-elected Councils has been reduced due 
to the formation of public transport joint boards in the 
metropolitan areas comprising nominated representatives of 
district councils and subject to direct expenditure control by 
the Secretary of State. 
Central government control and influence over transport spending 
by local authorities has been increased significantly. General 
financial controls have been tightened considerably since 1981 
with the introduction of the block grant system and provisions 
for the abatement of Rate Support Grant to penalise authorities 
spending in excess of levels designated by the Government. Since 
1985 authorities whose current expenditure is considered by the 
Secretary of state to be excessive can be subjected to 'rate- 
capping'. These provisions affect, in particular, expenditure on 
road maintenance and public transport revenue support and , 
concessionary fares. Local authorities1 capital expenditure is 
also subject to detailed central control and this has 
implications for the construction and improvement of local roads, 
public transport facilities and ports and airports facilities. 
Central government influence over local transport expenditure has 
been increased by the elimination of Transport Supplementary 
Grant Support for current expenditure and the restriction of such 
support to major highway schemes, and with the direct control 
over public transport expenditure in the metropolitan areas. 
In the discussion above we have considered some general arguments 
and evidence concerning the effects of these changes in central- 
local relations on the ability of local authorities to address 
effectively local transport problems. This discussion provides 
the context for the more detailed analysis of these effects and 
in the next section we summarise the particular issues upon which 
it is considered the analysis should focus. 
5. Research Issues 
In view of the time and resources available it will be necessary 
to focus on a limited number of issues in the next stages of the 
study. Moreover, in the selection of issues there are two 
particularly important considerations. First, the Government is 
proposing to replace the block grant system in the context of 
wider reform of the system of local government finance which also 
involves the abolition of domestic rates. This limits the 
practical usefulness of in-depth analysis of the workings of the 
current system. Second, the radical changes which have occured 
in the provision of local government services in London and the 
metropolitan area introduce major complications to the analysis. 
Specifically as regards local transportation expenditure, the 
main change affecting all English local authorities with 
transport responsibilities was the restriction of the scope of 
TSG from 1985/86 onwards to capital expenditure on roads of more 
than local importance and it is considered that the analysis of 
the implications of this change should constitute a major focus 
of the research. However, in order to evaluate this development 
fully it will be necessary to undertake the analysis in the 
context of the wider operation of the block grant system and 
capital expenditure controls. Only by examining how local 
authorities' transport expenditure and provision has been 
affected by features of the broader system of local government 
finance will it be possible to draw meaningful conclusions about 
the implications of the reform of TSG. 
Therefore, in the next stages of the research we will endeavour 
to provide answers to the following set of questions. 
1. The Block Grant Svstem 
1.1 What has been the impact of the expenditure restraints 
imposed on local authorities through the block grant system 
introduced in 1981/82, particularly grant abatement 
penalties, in terms of: 
a) the effect on local transport expenditure, in the areas 
of local road maintenance, public transport revenue 
support and capital expenditure via revenue 
implications, in comparison with the effects on other 
local authority services and functions; 
b) the effect on the scale of local transport problems and 
needs related to the above areas of expenditure? 
1.2 More specifically, what have been such impacts in those 
local authorities which have been subjected to selective 
rate limitation under the 1984 Rates Act? 
2. Ca~ital Ex~enditure Controls 
2.1 How has the regime of capital expenditure controls 
introduced in 1981/82 operated in terms of the ability.of 
local authorities to pursue the programmes of transport 
capital expenditure (particularly on road construction and 
improvement) which are perceived as necessary to address 
effectively local transport problems and needs? 
2.2 What has been the effect on transport capital programmes 
compared with other local authority capital programmes? 
2.3 What has been the effect on trends in transport problems and 
needs faced by local authorities? 
3. The TPP/TSG Svstem 
3.1 Within the context of the broader system of local government 
finance, to what extent did the TPP/TSG system, prior to the 
change in 1985/86, provide local authorities with the means 
to meet local transport needs effectively by supporting 
expenditure, in particular, on (a) local road maintenance, 
(b) public transport revenue support, and (c) highway 
construction and improvement? 
3.2 What has been the effect of the change in scope of TSG in 
1985/86 in terms of the ability of local authorities 
effectively to address perceived local needs and problems 
through expenditure in the above three programme areas? 
The discussion in section 4 of this paper highlighted the extent 
to which the control of local authorities' expenditure on public 
transport revenue support in London and the metropolitan areas 
represented a major consideration in the Government's policies 
towards local government during the mid-1980s. Therefore, an 
important issue for research concerns the impact of the 
Government's policies on public transport provision in these 
areas. The examination of this issue, as already indicated, is 
complicated by the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties 
in 1986 and by the effects of the 1985 Transport Act. 
Nevertheless, it is intended that our research will produce at 
least some provisional answers to the following questions: 
4. Public Transvort in the Metrovolitan Areas 
4.1 Prior to the abolition of the metropolitan counties in 1986, 
to what extent did the Government's measures to control 
spending on public transport revenue support by these 
authorities (via grant penalties, rate-capping, TSG 
settlements and PELS) affect their ability to meet local 
needs? 
4.2 What has been the effect of the introduction of public 
transport joint boards subject to 'precept limitation1 by 
the Secretary of State on the ability of Passenger Transport 
Authorities in the metropolitan areas to provide public 
transport services to meet local needs effectively? 
The approach to be adopted in the analysis of these issues will 
comprise two main stages. The first stage will involve the 
analysis of trends in local government expenditure on transport 
since 2979/80 which will be related to central government 
expenditure plans and provisions and to the changes which have 
been introduced in the systems for control of local authorities1 
spending. This analysis will be undertaken at national level, by 
class/tier of authority and by individual authorities and will 
cover the main areas of transport current and capital 
expenditure, referring also to relative trends in spending on 
other local authority services. The main initial focus will be 
on issues 1-3 above viz. the effects of the block grant system 
and capital expenditure control system and particularly, within 
this context, the operation of the TPP/TSG system. The detailed 
examination of trends in public transport provision in the 
metropolitan areas will depend upon the time available for the 
study. From this first stage of the analysis it will be possible 
to draw initial conclusions about the effects of central 
government policies and controls which will provide a focus for 
the second stage of the empirical analysis. 
This second stage will attempt to examine in more detail the 
initial conclusions about the impact of central government 
policies and controls in the context of a small sample of local 
authorities selected to represent the range of problems faced by 
local government. The objective will be to assess in some 
detail the validity of the initial conclusions, the nature of the 
cause and effect relationships, and the implications for the 
ability of the local authorities to address effectively the local 
transport problems and needs with which they are faced. The 
focus at this stage will be three main expenditure programme 
areas viz. highway maintenance, public transport revenue support 
and highway construction and improvement. In these areas an 
attempt will be made to interpret trends in the scale and scope 
of problems and needs in the context of the findings relating to 
the effects of central government controls on the local 
authorities1 transport expenditure and provision. Once again, it 
is likely that the detailed analysis of public transport in the 
metropolitan areas will depend upon the time available. 
Annex 1: Theories of Central-Local Relations 
The Importance of a theoretical context for work in this area is 
stressed by Saunders who argues that: 
It.. the question of central-local relations needs to be 
approached not primarily as an issue about organisation and 
management, but with reference to core theoretical concerns 
in social and political science, with questions of political 
power and domination, class relations, and the state. 
Research which remains at the level of institutional and 
organisation analysis, and which fails to relate this to 
broader theoretical issues, is in danger of *fetishizingl 
the question of inter-governmental relations.I1 
- 
(Saunders 1982, p. 56) 
Much of the theoretical debate about central-local relations has 
been conducted in terms of organisational analysis and in terms 
of a dichotomy between 'agent1 and *partnership1 models 
(Saunders, 1984: Page, 1986; Davies et all 1986). The 
traditional 'agent* model developed during a period when local 
government became increasingly dependent upon central government 
grants and therefore came to be seen as merely an extension of 
central government and subject to its control. However, during 
the 1970s this view was challenged as studies demonstrated the 
extent to which local factors influenced local government 
decision-making and, therefore, local authorities came to be seen 
as political systems in their own right, existing in a 
'partnership1 with central government. 
The onset of financial stringency in 1976 and the subsequent 
actions by central government (revolving around the Treasury) to 
attempt to impose strict controls on local authority spending 
resulted in a re-appraisal of theory and a return to a focus more 
characteristic of the *agent1 model, stressing the constraints on 
local choice and *I... the underlying weaknesses of local 
government in its relationship with the centre." (Page 1986, p. 
124). Attention was increasingly focussed on the question of 
power - how dominant groups in organisations derive their power, 
how they mobilise available power resources, and the extent to 
which there are structural constraints on the power relationship 
between central and local government (Saunders 1984, p. 24-5). 
The focus on power, and its basis in the economic, political and 
ideological context in which governmental organisations operate, 
is developed most in Marxist literature. Here the relationship 
between central and local government is interpreted in terms of 
the broader theory of the role of the state in relation to 
capital accumulation and the interests of the dominant capitalist 
classes (Dunleavy, 1984). Although there are different 
approaches within the Marxist tradition, two particular aspects 
of Marxist theories have attracted criticism. Firstly, there is 
a tendency to interpret the position and role of local government 
unproblematically in terms of the general theory of the 
capitalist state and to see local government as It... the central 
state writ smallll (Saunders 1982, p. 56). Therefore, there is a 
danger of 'theoretical foreclosure8 of interesting questions 
relating to the scope and nature of local autonomy and the nature 
of the constraints under which the local state operates. 
The second controversial aspect of Marxist theory concerns the 
tendency to assert that power and political conflict must be 
interpreted and understood in terms of class analysis and that 
class theories of political conflict can be applied to the 
analysis of local government. Critics argue that since local 
government is primarily concerned with 'social consumptionf, the 
analysis of power and conflict in local government must refer to 
'sectoral interestsf defined in relation to the mode of 
consumption of particular services (Saunders, 1982; 1984). 
As analysis of the state and central-local relations has 
highlighted contradictions related to the above two theoretical 
issues, so ,Dual State' theories have gained in currency in the 
attempt to resolve them. Deriving from the above criticisms of 
Marxist theories, Saunders (1982; 1984) propounded a dual state 
thesis which conceptualises the contradictions in terms of three 
main dimensions. The first dimension employs the distinction 
between 'social investmentf and 'social consumptionf 
expenditures, between support for private sector profitability 
and the provision of welfare services, the central state being 
primarily concerned with the former, and the local state with the 
latter. The second dimension refers to the basis of political 
power and action distinguishing between the 'corporate biasf 
evident in central decision-making processes (whereby the 
functional economic interests of capital and organised labour are 
incorporated into such processes) and the more open fpluralistf 
competitive nature of politics at the local level. The third 
dimension embodies the ideological contradiction between the 
principles of market organisation and the rights of private 
property on the one hand and those of collectivism and the rights 
of citizenship on the other. Saunders argues that the former 
represents the ideology of the central state while the latter 
provides the ideological basis for local government service 
provision. 
Saunders argues that the dual state thesis helps in understanding 
central-local relations by explaining the constraints under which 
local government operates in terms of 'structural dominancef 
along the above three dimensions: 
I1First, social consumption functions are necessarily 
subordinate to social investment functions since the latter 
are crucial in maintaining the conditions in which 
production may continue. Secondly, democratic 
accountability to a local population is necessarily 
curtailed by corporatist strategies at the centre. Thirdly, 
ideologies of social need take second place in a capitalist 
society to ideologies of private p r~per t y .~~  
(Saunders 1982, p. 63) 
Saunders developed his thesis as an ,ideal type1 intended to 
assist the development of empirical and theoretical work, 
recognising that it does not represent a total description of the 
relationship between the central and local state. Nevertheless, 
there have been many criticisms related to the artificiality of 
the dualisms propounded. For example, it has been argued that 
the division between social investment and social consumption is 
difficult to operationalise because most state expenditure is of 
a mixed type (Dunleavy 1984, p. 71-2; Martlew 1983, p: 128). 
This can be seen in the case of transportation expenditure which 
is directed both at assisting private sector business 
profitability and capital accumulation and at meeting the needs 
of the non-car owning local population for a 'socially defined1 
degree of mobility. 
Moreover, the distinction between corporatist and pluralist 
decision-making has been criticised as too simplistic, 
neglecting the operation of corporatist influences at the local 
level and also the role of professional communities which cut 
across the central/local state distinction and provide It... 
professionally promoted 'fashions'" which constrain the operation 
of pluralism at the local level (Dunleavy 1984, p. 76-8). In 
effect the artificiality of the 8dualisms1 raises doubts about 
the extent to which the contradictions embodied in them can 
provide the major basis of power and conflict in central-local 
relations (Martlew 1983, p. 128). 
Whilst recognising that the central and local components of the 
state have different characteristics in terms of the dimensions 
identified by Saunders (viz. economic function, mode of interest 
mediation and ideological principle), the 'dual state1 theory can 
be criticised as imposing an artificial analytical framework. 
From a theoretical point of view it is difficult to see why 
social and political forces regarded as relevant to the analysis 
at one level of the state should not be present at other levels, 
albeit possibly manifested in different forms, and to different 
degrees. From this perspective we are not dealing in ldualismsl 
but in a range and variety of forms of the state the actions of 
which can be explained with reference to a common set of relevant 
social and political forces, the balance or 'mix1 of which will 
vary in the different levels and forms of the state and over 
time . 
Of course, progress in determining the 'validity8 of competing 
theories does depend, to an important degree, on the 
interpretation of results from empirical work to test hypotheses 
and propositions. In our research, we will attempt to relate our 
findings to certain theoretical propositions about the role of 
local government and its relation to the central state. These 
propositions derive from a theoretical framework advanced by 
Martlew (1983) which explains the rstructural constraints* on 
state action and the 'hierarchical relationshipr between central 
and local government in terms of 'institutional interestsr 
deriving from certain social and political forces. 
Thus, the state can be seen as embodying a variety of interests 
which compete and conflict with one another, these interests 
being related to the requirement of the state firstly, to promote 
capital accumulation through its various roles and activities 
and, secondly, to protect the accumulation process by controlling 
the fiscal demands of state activities and services (Martlew op 
cit, p. 129). Tension or conflict between the ,institutional 
interestsr within the state apparatus arises from the 
contradiction between, on the one hand, pressures to increase 
state spending (both to assist capital accumulation and to 
provide the welfare services needed to maintain political 
support and legitimacy) and, on the other hand, pressures to 
control demands on the state budget (to ensure that private 
accumulation is not undermined). These tensions or conflicts 
provide the structural constraints on state action and express 
the dominance of interests related to the promotion and 
protection of capital accumulation (ibid, p. 130-1). 
More specifically, such conflicts between 'instutional interests* 
are mediated through central departments of the state and, via 
their control, local authorities. On the one hand, the various 
central spending departments undertake activities and provide 
services to support private sector accumulation, to reproduce the 
labour force and to provide welfare services, with various of 
these activities and services being the main responsibility of 
local government within parameters set by the central 
departments. On the other hand, interests related to controlling 
state spending so as to ensure that it does not undermine private 
accumulation, are embodied mainly in the Treasury (ibid, p. 132- 
3). Within this framework local government can be seen as 
playing a role in the provision of services to support capital 
accumulation, labour force reproduction and to support a level of 
welfare provision sufficient to maintain the legitimacy of the 
state, subject to structural constraints deriving from the 
balance of institutional interests within the state. Moreover, 
local government can be seen as playing an important additional 
role in maintaining the political legitimacy of the state in that 
it fragments and tends to mask responsibility for the provision 
of services and therefore absorbs and disperses political 
opposition which would otherwise focus entirely on the central 
state (ibid, p. 132). 
Annex 2 : The Block Grant Svstem 
1. The basic block grant system can be expressed in terms of a 
two-stage formula (Gibson, 1982; Gibson et all 1987): 
and 
GRP; = GRP* + X (TEc - GREC) for TEj < TL -------------- 
pi 







the block grant entitlement of local authority i ; 
the 'total expenditure' of local authority i (i.e. 
expenditure net of other grant receipts); 
the grant related poundage of local authority i ; 
the gross rateable value of local authority i ; 
the multiplier for local authority i ; 
the GRP for spending at the level of Grant-Related 
Expenditure (GRE) for the class of authorities of 
which authority i is a member; 
the Grant-Related Expenditure of local authority i ; 
the population of local authority i ; 
the threshold value of expenditure for local 
authority i (on average (1.10 . GRE)); 
the marginal increase (in pence) in the GRP schedule 
for every f per head increase in spending below 
the threshold T ; 
the marginal increase (in pence) in the GRP schedule 
for every f per head increase in spending above 
the threshold T ; 
2. Therefore, the basic formula for the distribution of block 
grant provides for each authority to receive a grant equal 
to the difference between its total expenditure and an 
amount of rate income which the authority is assumed by the 
Government to raise from its own rateable resources. This 
assumed rate income is a function of Grant-Related Poundage 
(GRP). GRP essentially represents a rate poundage which the 
authority is assumed to levy at each level of total 
expenditure i.e. it is a form of 'tax effort function' 
(Gibson et all 1987; p. 160). Authorities within the same 
class or tier face the same GRP function. Figure A1 
illustrates the nature of the GRP function and its effect on 

block grant at different levels of total expenditure (TE;) 
for an hypothetical local authority. 
3 .  In Figure Al(a) the coefficients x and y have value, 
respectively, of 0.6 and 0 . 7 5 ~ ~  those being equivalent to 
the actual figures used by the Government up to 1984/85. 
Therefore, for spending up to the level of Ti (= 1.10. 
GRE;) block grant increases by £0.41 for every £1.00 
increase in T E ~ ,  whereas for TEk > T i  block grant increase 
by only £0.26 for each unit increase in TE;. These figures 
are purely hypothetical, assuming that authority i has a GRE 
of £100 million, giving a GRP* of £1.30 and using a 
multiplier (Mi) of 0.9865 (of Audit Commission 1984, p. 67). 
4. The multiplier (ML) is used to modify the basic distribution 
formula for various purposes. A multiplier of less than 1 
reduces the rate poundage or precept which an authority 
needs to levy to finance a given level of expenditure (i.e. 
increases block grant) and conversely for a multiplier of 
greater than 1. Multipliers have been used for the 
following purposes: 
a) to limit the change in the amount of block grant 
payable to an authority from year to year due, for 
example, to changes in GRE methodology and data 
('safety nets1 to limit losses and 'caps' to limit 
gains) ; 
b) to make provision in the London area to moderate the 
effects on ratepayers of the relatively high rateable 
values and to allocate a share of the costs of the 
Metropolitan Police to authorities bordering the 
Greater London area; 
c) to reduce the block grant entitlement of authorities 
exceeding their expenditure guidance under the system 
of expenditure targets and grant penalties operating up 
to 1985/86. 
5. With the abolition of the system of targets and penalties in 
1986/87 modifications were made by the Government to the GRP 
schedules so that grant abatement penalties for high 
spending authorities could be built into the basic block 
grant formula. Figure Al(b) illustrates the GRP function 
with the new coefficients of x = 1.1 and y = 1.5 and the 
resulting block grant allocations to our hypothetical local 
authority over a range of total expenditure, TEf. It can be 
seen that this modified system represents a more severe 
restraint on local authorities' expenditure. Prior to 
1986/87 authorities not exceeding their expenditure target 
(or guidance) and therefore not subject to a multiplier M i  > 
1, received an increase in block grant as their expenditure 
increased; this was true even for those authorities for 
which TEL > GREi where the target exceeded GREL . Since 
1986/87 authorities have experienced a decline in block 
grant as total expenditure increases, with the rate of, 
decline being more marked for TEi > Ti. This has provided 
authorities with a greater incentive to reduce total 
expenditure; for example, in our example (Figure Al(b), if 
TE; = (Ti + lo%), block grant covers 51% of total 
expenditure whereas if TE; = (TL - lo%), block grant covers 
69% of total expenditure. 
6. Prior to 1987/88 a system of 'grant recyclingr operated 
whereby adjustments had to be made to authorities1 block 
grant entitlements during the year to which they applied, 
and after the close of the year, because the system was 
designed to distribute between authorities a given cash- 
limited sum available to cover all block grant payments. 
Therefore, if some authorities made significant savings 
during the financial year they could increase their block 
grant entitlement and this would reduce that available for 
distribution to other authorities. This adjustment process 
was also called 'close-ending'. However, following the Rate 
Support Grants Act 1987, this procedure was changed and the 
total block grant available is now a flexible sum being the 
total of the grants paid to all authorities in accordance 
with the distribution formula. 
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